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DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE REACH OF
ESCOBAR’S MATERIALITY STANDARD: IMPLIED
AND EXPRESS CERTIFICATION
Jake Summerlin*
ABSTRACT
In 2016, the Supreme Court altered the landscape of the False
Claims Act by recognizing implied certification as a viable theory of
liability. Before the Court decided Universal Health Services, Inc. v.
United States ex rel. Escobar, courts disagreed over the scope and
legitimacy of the theory, arguing that it could create runaway liability
if not held in check. The Court, although recognizing that implied
certification expanded the reach of the False Claims Act, reassured
itself and government contractors by reinforcing the common law
antecedents of fraud, namely, that misrepresentations and omissions
must be material to the government’s decision to pay a claim.
Moreover, Justice Thomas, writing for the unanimous Court,
characterized the law’s materiality standard as “demanding.”
In Escobar, the Court sought to provide clarity for highly complex
False Claims Act litigation. Instead, the decision created even more
confusion as courts have attempted to apply the “demanding”
standard for materiality. Specifically, some courts across the country
have applied the new materiality standard to other theories of liability,
including the express false certification theory which was not at issue
in Escobar. Others have limited Escobar strictly to cases arising under
implied certification. The two theories of liability, although similar,
have vastly different implications for what constitutes fraud under the
False Claims Act. Courts that apply Escobar to express certifications
overlook this crucial, albeit subtle, difference.
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This Note argues that the “demanding” materiality standard
articulated by the Court in Escobar should be limited to the implied
false certification theory of liability. This argument relies on the
history, text, and purpose of the False Claims Act, as well as the
appropriate role of the courts in determining what legislative and
administrative actions are considered material. In doing so, this Note
hopes to provide clarity as to when Escobar’s “demanding”
materiality standard should be applied and, more importantly, when it
should not.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider a hypothetical. The United States government contracts
with a private company to construct a government office building with
a requirement that all contractors and subcontractors must use
American-made nails.1 The contractor must complete the project in ten
phases and must submit an invoice for payment at the end of each
phase. If the nails used in the final phase of the project were in fact
imported from China, would submitting an invoice to the government
without disclosing the fact that the building was finished with imported
nails make the contractor’s claim for payment fraudulent? Is the use of
imported nails enough to entitle the government to seek one of the
harshest civil remedies warranted under federal law?2 The law of
contracts suggests not.3 Although such may be true of the law between
private parties, it has been said that people must “turn square corners
when they deal with the Government.”4 The False Claims Act (FCA)
makes it illegal to submit false or fraudulent claims to the government
for payment or approval. 5 So, in the case of the hypothetical
construction company, at what point does the apparent breach of
contract become fraudulent?
This question was hotly debated in the world of government
contracting before the United States Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in

1. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2004 (2016).
Justice Thomas, writing for the unanimous Court, recounted the United States’ position at oral argument
to emphasize the government’s “expansive view” of the False Claims Act. Id. Under that view, “[i]f the
Government contracts for health services and adds a requirement that contractors buy American-made
staplers, anyone who submits a claim for those services but fails to disclose its use of foreign staplers
violates the False Claims Act.” Id.
2. 31 U.S.C. § 3729. Violating the False Claims Act can subject defendants up to three times the
amount they illegally obtained from the government. Id. § 3729(a) (flush language).
3. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921) (“Considerations partly of
justice and partly of presumable intention are to tell us whether this or that promise shall be placed in one
class or in another.”). As articulated by then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo, a contractor’s substantial
performance cannot be the basis for a total breach of the contract. Id. at 892. There, the contractor had
used wrought iron pipe made in various other factories and not “‘standard pipe’ of Reading manufacture”
as required in the contract. Id. at 890.
4. Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920) (“Men must turn square
corners when they deal with the Government. If it attaches even purely formal conditions to its consent to
be sued those conditions must be complied with.”).
5. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
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Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, and
given the ambiguity in that decision, it remains unsettled to this day. 6
In Escobar, the question was whether the so-called implied false
certification theory of liability under the FCA was viable as recognized
by some but not all circuit courts.7 Under the implied false certification
theory, a defendant’s submission of an invoice to the government
while knowing that it is not in compliance with one or more statutory,
regulatory, or contractual requirements makes the otherwise factually
accurate claim for payment a false claim and therefore actionable
under the FCA.8 The plaintiffs in Escobar alleged that a healthcare
provider seeking payment for its services to government healthcare
beneficiaries while in breach of personnel licensing regulations
constituted an implied false certification under the FCA.9 Although the
unanimous Court ultimately agreed that implied false certification is a
viable theory of liability, it set boundaries on when this type of
statutory or regulatory violation may subject a party to FCA liability. 10
According to the Court, a defendant’s implied certification of

6. See Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994), aff’d per curiam, 57 F.3d
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). The Court of Federal Claims implied a False Claims
Act violation where a contractor had breached the terms of a Small Business Administration program. Id.
In Escobar, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve longstanding disagreement in
the courts of appeals over the so-called implied certification theory of False Claims Act liability. Escobar,
136 S. Ct. at 1998–99.
7. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1998–99; see also Jacob J. Stephens, Dicta Me This: Implied False
Certification to Materiality Under the False Claims Act Post-Escobar, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 273, 280–
81 (2019) (discussing the circuit split).
8. See McNutt ex rel. United States v. Haleyville Med. Supplies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.
2005) (“When a violator of government regulations is ineligible to participate in a government program
and that violator persists in presenting claims for payment that the violator knows the government does
not owe, that violator is liable, under the Act, for its submission of those false claims: ‘The False Claims
Act does not create liability merely for a health care provider’s disregard of Government regulations or
improper internal policies unless, as a result of such acts, the provider knowingly asks the Government to
pay amounts it does not owe.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., Inc., 290
F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002))).
9. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1997; see also Ab-Tech, 31 Fed. Cl. at 434 (finding that defendant implied
compliance with all program requirements when it submitted requests for progress payments).
10. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001. The Court’s first holding was that FCA liability can attach under an
implied false certification theory of liability. Id. at 1995 (“We first hold that, at least in certain
circumstances, the implied false certification theory can be a basis for liability.”). The Court qualified this
holding with the “demanding” and “rigorous” standard for materiality. Id. at 2002–03 (“[A]
misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be
material to the Government’s payment decision in order to be actionable under the False Claims Act.”).

Published by Reading Room, 2022

5

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 13

576

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:2

compliance is actionable under the FCA only where the certification is
material to the government’s payment decision.11
After Escobar, the imported nails might not translate to FCA
liability for the hypothetical company.12 But what if the United States
and China are in a trade war? What if Congress enacts a law that
requires all construction contracts with the government to include a
provision that all nails must be American-made in an effort to boost
domestic steel production? What if the contractor must promise on
every invoice submitted to the government that “I certify, in
recognition of the United States’ effort to boost domestic steel
production, that only American-made nails have been used in the
construction of this office building”? How does Escobar’s materiality
standard stack up against Congress’s constitutional authority to
legislate?13
These questions were unfortunately left unresolved by Escobar.14
Many of the unresolved issues stem from the Court’s analysis
regarding what conduct is considered material under the Act. 15
Although the Court recognized that the FCA defines material as having
the “natural tendency” to influence the government’s payment
decision, the Court went on to characterize the FCA’s materiality

11. Id. at 2001.
12. See generally Thad Leach & Christina Randolph, Escobar Case Limits False Claims Act Liability
for Providers, JD SUPRA (July 22, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/escobar-case-limits-falseclaims-act-11265/ [https://perma.cc/MV9M-HE2H] (discussing how merely labeling a representation
does not determine materiality). The healthcare industry saw Escobar as an effective tool to limit
healthcare providers’ FCA liability. Id. But see Anthony Anikeeff & Jeremy Ball, Risk and Uncertainty
for Health Care Providers and Government Contractors in the Wake of Universal Health Services v.
Escobar, JD SUPRA (July 7, 2016), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/risk-and-uncertainty-for-healthcare-37826/ [https://perma.cc/N6UX-69K7] (Escobar decision “creates additional uncertainty about
potential FCA” liability).
13. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). Congress has the constitutional
duty to make laws that are “calculated to effect any of the objects [e]ntrusted to the government . . . .” Id.;
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States . . . .”).
14. Escobar’s holding that “the implied certification theory can be a basis for liability” is silent on
other theories of liability. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001; see also Joan H. Krause, Reflections on
Certification, Interpretation, and the Quest for Fraud that “Counts” Under the False Claims Act, 2017
U. ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1835 (2017) (“[Escobar] . . . failed to clarify whether materiality is required only
in suits brought under the implied certification theory or whether it applies to all suits
under § 3729(a)(1)(A) . . . .”).
15. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 284.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss2/13
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standard as “demanding.”16 The opinion has led to much litigation as
courts attempt to apply the “demanding” standard for materiality to
other theories of liability under the Act, including express false
certifications of compliance not at issue in Escobar.17 The debate is
the result of the Court failing to articulate whether its materiality
analysis for determining liability in cases involving implied false
certifications extends to the express false certification theory of
liability.18 The answer to this question depends on who you ask.19
This Note addresses whether the Court’s limits on implied false
certifications apply equally to express false certifications under the
FCA. Part I offers a brief history of the FCA, the basics of liability,
and the context of the Court’s decision in Escobar.20 Part II analyzes
the post-Escobar jurisprudence and its application in cases brought
under both implied and express false certification theories of
liability.21 Part III revisits Escobar with a proposal that its application
should be applied narrowly to the implied certification context because
of the text and intent of the FCA as well as the fundamental separation
of powers principle.22

16. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002–03.
17. See Krause, supra note 14.
18. See Matt Curley, FCA Deeper Dive: Express Certification, BASS, BERRY & SIMS: INSIDE THE FCA
(June
1,
2017),
https://www.insidethefca.com/fca-deeper-dive-express-certification/
[https://perma.cc/SD25-MJMG]. The FCA defense bar was quick to argue that Escobar’s “materiality
requirement should apply equally to FCA cases where falsity is premised on an express certification.” Id.
(first citing United States ex rel. Thomas v. Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp., 820 F.3d 1162, 1174
(10th Cir. 2016); and then citing United States ex rel. Se. Carpenters Reg’l Council v. Fulton Cnty., No.
14-cv-4071, 2016 WL 4158392, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 5, 2016)). But see CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 4:34.50, at n.4, Westlaw (database updated Apr.
2021) (“Escobar did not address so-called ‘express certification’ or expressly false statements and there
is no reason to believe it affected claims based on such a theory.” (first citing United States ex rel. Wood
v. Allergan, Inc. 246 F. Supp. 3d 772 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), rev’d on other grounds, 899 F.3d 163 (2d Cir.
2018); then citing United States ex rel. Presser v. Acacia Mental Health Clinic, LLC, 836 F.3d 770 (7th
Cir. 2016); and then citing Scollick ex rel. United States v. Narula, No. 14-cv-1339, 2020 WL 6544734
(D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2020))).
19. SYLVIA, supra note 18, § 4:34.50.
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
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I. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the FCA in 1863 in response to the rampant fraud
and abuse that took place during the Civil War. 23 High wartime
demand caused the federal government to accept almost any offer for
war supplies at any price offered by private contractors. 24 As a result,
the Union Army often received “spavined beasts and dying donkeys”
when it bought horses or the “refuse of shops and foreign armories”
when it purchased muskets and pistols. 25 The lack of response from
the federal government made the prospect of getting into business with
the Union Army very appealing for unscrupulous private contractors. 26
To recoup some of the money lost to contractor fraud for the
government treasury, Congress enacted the FCA, which attaches civil
liability to any person or entity who submits false or fraudulent claims
for payment to the government. 27 Although the FCA is a financial
23. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986); see also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863) (“The
country, as we know, has been full of complaints respecting the frauds and corruptions practiced in
obtaining pay from the Government during the present war; and it is said, and earnestly urged upon our
attention, that further legislation is pressingly necessary to prevent this great evil; and I suppose there can
be no doubt that these complaints are, in the main, well founded.”).
24. See Robert Tomes, The Fortunes of War: How They Are Made and Spent, 29 HARPER’S NEW
MONTHLY MAG. 227, 227 (1864) (“The Government, pressed by a necessity which admitted of no
hesitation in regard to time, character, quantity, quality, and cost, accepted almost every offer, and paid
almost any price.”).
25. Id. at 228.
26. See JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 1.01, at 1-6 (2d ed. Supp.
2002). Because the Department of Justice had not been created yet, the Attorney General could not
coordinate with U.S. District Attorneys for an effective federal response. Id. § 1.01, at 1-7; see also
Tomes, supra note 24, at 228 (“Poor men thus became rich men between the rising and setting of the same
day’s sun; while hundreds of thousands of dollars of the wealthy increased to millions in the same brief
space of time. It is said that one of our great merchant princes gained from his transactions with
Government two millions of dollars in a single year.”).
27. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Subsection (a) reads as follows:
(a) Liability for certain acts.—
(1) In general.—Subject to paragraph (2), any person who—
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record
or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;
(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E),
(F), or (G);
(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to
be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes to be

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss2/13
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recoupment tool for the federal government, it operates just as much
as a warning—any defendant in violation of the Act is liable to the
United States up to three times the amount of money the government
has lost.28 Although the federal government is the party-in-interest
under the Act, private individuals attribute in large part to the
effectiveness of the FCA.29 The Act’s qui tam provisions incentivize
private individuals aware of fraudulent conduct to bring an action in
the name of the United States. 30 These individuals (called relators
because they relate information to the federal government) are entitled
to a portion of the proceeds recouped by the government. 31 After being
revitalized in 1986 and again in 2009 with more expansive provisions
delivered, less than all of that money or property;
(E) is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of
property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to
defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without
completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
(F) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt,
public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a
member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge
property; or
(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record
or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and
improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money
or property to the Government,
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000
and not more than $10,000, as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act of 1990 . . . , plus 3 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person.
Id.
28. Id. § 3729(a)(1) (flush language); see also S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 17. The 1986 amendments to the
False Claims Act increased the government’s damages from double to triple the amount the defendant
obtained illegally. Id.
29. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers over $3 Billion from False
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentrecovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019 [https://perma.cc/R23L-64AP]. False
Claims Act cases brought by qui tam relators accounted for $2.1 billion of the government’s total $3
billion recovery. Id.; see also BOESE, supra note 26, at 1-4 (“qui tam enforcement of the Act can be
expected to increase even more substantially in light of recent decisions that have awarded qui tam
plaintiffs tens of millions of dollars as ‘bounties’ for bringing suits.”).
30. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (“A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for
the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the
Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent
to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”).
31. Id. § 3730(d). In some cases, the relator is entitled to receive up to 25% of the government’s total
recovery. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
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and greater clarity, today the FCA is the federal government’s most
effective tool in combatting financial fraud. 32
A. Liability Under the False Claims Act
The FCA’s liability language has remained largely intact over the
century and a half since its passage in 1863.33 But the original
provisions of the Act could not have contemplated the complexities of
the modern economy and the contemporary relationship between the
government and private sector. 34 The drafters of the Act in 1863 could
not have imagined a healthcare system where the federal government
pays billions in Medicare claims to private hospitals or a housing
market where private lenders issue billions in loans guaranteed by the
government.35 The result of the burgeoning relationship between the
government and the private sector is that the courts have largely shaped
the modern contours of FCA liability. 36
The standard judge-made test for an actionable FCA claim is as
follows: (1) a false or fraudulent claim is made; (2) the defendant has
the requisite scienter; and (3) the claim is presented or caused to be

32. See BOESE, supra note 26, § 1.04, at 1-27 (“Since the [1986] [A]mendments, over $3.8 billion has
been recovered in FCA cases.”); see generally S. REP. NO. 111-10 (2009); Press Release, supra note 29
(“In addition to combating health care fraud, the False Claims Act serves as the government’s primary
civil tool to redress false claims for federal funds and property involving a multitude of other government
operations and functions.”). See generally S. REP. NO. 99-345.
33. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 17 (1986) (“With two exceptions, amendments made to the qui tam
provisions in 1943 and a recodification of the Act in 1982, the statute has been largely unchanged since
enacted 123 years ago.”).
34. See, e.g., BOESE, supra note 26, at 2-5 to -6 (“Few of [the FCA’s] provisions are the result of
reflection on the complex business practices of the modern era, or the degree of culpability surrounding
inaccurate claims or statements in financial transactions with the government.”).
35. See HHS FY 2018 Budget in Brief–CMS–Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2018/budget-in-brief/cms/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5NWGC3MF] (May 23, 2017) (spending about $15 billion dollars in government health care programs). The VA
guaranteed over $180 billion in mortgage loans made by private lenders in 2017. 2017 All VA Lenders by
Total
Volume,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
VETERANS
AFFS.,
https://www.benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/documents/docs/2017totalvolume.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AK5U-MRY2] (July 7, 2021); see also Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The
False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 458–61
(1998) (discussing history of qui tam lawsuits and the False Claims Act).
36. See BOESE, supra note 26, at 2-6 (noting how the FCA has “engendered considerable judge-made
law”).
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presented by the defendant to the United States.37 Prior to the 2009
amendments, however, most courts created an implicit fourth element
in FCA cases: the defendant’s false claim must be material to the
government’s decision to pay the claim. 38 Courts that implied this
fourth element of liability used a standard definition of materiality
developed through the common law. 39 The “natural tendency”
standard of materiality was generally recognized to be easier for an
FCA plaintiff to satisfy because the false claim need only have the
“potential to influence” the government’s decision to pay the claim. 40
The 2009 amendments, part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act (FERA), codified this standard by defining the term “material” as
“having a natural tendency to influence, or being capable of
influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”41
The FCA is intended to reach a broad range of fraud against the
United States.42 The Act separates causes of action into seven different
37. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Walker v. R&F Props. of Lake Cnty., Inc., 433 F.3d 1349, 1355
(11th Cir. 2005). This test typifies the standard for a presentment claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A). Id. There
are, however, seven causes of action under the FCA. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. See United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 2008) (incorporating materiality
element into FCA cases based on theory of promissory fraud); United States ex rel. Loughren v. Unum
Grp., 613 F.3d 300, 307 (1st Cir. 2010) (previously finding FCA subject to “judicially-imposed”
materiality requirement). Many of the circuits had read in a materiality requirement to FCA cases before
the 2009 amendments. See United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 760 (3d Cir.
2017). Rather than creating a new element to an FCA claim, the 2009 amendments “merely made explicit
and consistent that which had previously been [] judicially[-]imposed.” Id. at 761.
39. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (defining material as having “‘a natural
tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of’ the decision[-]making body”); see
also Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016)
(recognizing that the materiality requirement in the False Claims Act “descends from ‘common-law
antecedents’” (quoting Kungys, 485 U.S. at 769)).
40. JAMES B. HELMER, JR., FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION 281 (Bloomberg
BNA 7th ed. 2017); see also United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., Inc., 575 F.3d 458,
470 (5th Cir. 2009) (“All that is required under the test for materiality, therefore, is that the false or
fraudulent statements have the potential to influence the government’s decisions.”).
41. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4); see Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733); S. REP. NO.
111-10, at 12 (2009). The 2009 amendments changed the previous version of the Act to add the words
“material to” that modified the phrase “false or fraudulent claim.” Id. The materiality language was only
added to two provisions of the amended Act: “false statement or records” claims under 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) and “obligation” claims under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). Id. Importantly, the
materiality language was not added to any other cause of action in the amended Act. See infra Section
II.C.2.
42. E.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968) (FCA is “intended to reach all
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categories.43 The Act makes liable anyone who presents or causes to
be presented a false or fraudulent claim for payment (a “presentment”
claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A)); anyone who makes or uses a false
record or causes another to make or use a false record material to the
payment of a false claim (a “false record” claim under
§ 3729(a)(1)(B)); and anyone who conspires to violate any other
provision of the Act.44 The Act’s scienter provision requires a
defendant knowingly submit a false or fraudulent claim, although a
defendant does not need the specific intent to defraud the United
States.45
Even though the FCA includes false claims that take many forms,
the courts have been left to assess the scope of liability. 46 One such
types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Government.”). The 1986
amendments intended to reinvigorate the FCA by increasing the financial incentives for qui tam relators
to align with the broad interpretation of the Act offered by the Supreme Court in Neifert-White Co. See S.
REP. NO. 99-345, at 2, 19 (1986).
43. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G).
44. Compare id. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (“any person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” (emphasis added)), with id. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (“any
person who knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to
a false or fraudulent claim”) A claim under § 3729(a)(1)(B) does not require the presentment of a false
claim but does require an affirmative false statement or false record. See United States ex rel. Fallon v.
Accudyne Corp., 921 F. Supp. 611, 627 (W.D. Wis. 1995). At a functional level, the distinction serves to
“remove any defense that the defendant did not personally submit a false claim directly to the
government.” BOESE, supra note 26, § 2.01, at 2-20.
45. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1). A defendant has the requisite knowledge under the FCA where it has
“actual knowledge . . . [,] acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information[,] or acts in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information . . . .” Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). The Act
requires no specific intent to defraud. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(B). Before the 2009 amendments, the Supreme
Court held in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders that a defendant must purposefully
submit a false record for a relator to state a claim under the FCA. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex
rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 665 (2008), superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
(FERA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617. Many scholars believe that the 2009 amendments
were a direct response to what Congress believed was an erroneous interpretation of the law. See HELMER,
supra note 40, at 95 (“Within a year of the Supreme Court’s decision in Allison Engine, Congress enacted
and President Obama signed a bipartisan bill that overhauled the FCA to restore some of the vigor taken
out of it by the courts, all under the heading: ‘Clarifications to the False Claims Act to Reflect the Original
Intent of the Law.’ And, tellingly, the amendment to former [§] 3729(a)(2), now [§] 3729(a)(1)(B), was
explicitly made retroactive to two days before the Supreme Court’s decision in Allison Engine.” (footnote
omitted)); see also S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12 (expressing intent of bill to correct Allison Engine).
46. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (“The False Claims Act is intended to reach all fraudulent attempts to
cause the Government to pay out sums of money or to deliver property or services. Accordingly, a false
claim may take many forms, the most common being a claim for goods or services not provided, or
provided in violation of contract terms, specification, statute, or regulation.”); SYLVIA, supra note
18, § 4:34 (tracing how the “malleable,” judicially-created categories have been extended or limited
throughout the federal courts).
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judge-made distinction relates to whether claims are considered false
under the Act. The straightforward factually false claim is one in which
a contractor seeks payments for goods or services that were never
provided, such as seeking payment for a horse but providing a
donkey.47 Legally false claims are claims made false by the law;
although the invoices may be factually accurate, they are nevertheless
false claims because the defendant submits the claim to the
government despite knowing that it is in violation of a federal statute
or regulation that is a condition of eligibility for the government
program or benefit.48 Under this theory, the claim is legally false
despite being factually accurate about the goods or services provided. 49
Also known as the “false certification theory,” legally false claims
violate the FCA because the government pays the claim based on the
defendant’s certification of compliance with relevant statutes,
regulations, or other contractual terms.50
The courts have further separated legally false claims into two
separate theories of liability, which are both based on the defendant’s
certification of compliance to the government. 51 First, express false

47. See United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir.
2008). Express false certification applies when the defendant “falsely certifies compliance with a
particular statute, regulation or contractual term, where compliance is a prerequisite to payment.” Id.
(quoting Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 698 (2d. Cir. 2001), overruled by Universal Health Servs., Inc. v.
United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016)); see also Tomes, supra note 24, at 228 (“For sugar
it often got sand; for coffee, rye; for leather, something no better than brown paper.”).
48. See United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 1977). In Hibbs, an early false certification
case, the defendant real estate broker caused the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) to guarantee mortgages
based on the defendant’s certifications that it complied with Housing and Urban Development regulations.
Id. at 349, 351. Although the court decided that the defendant did not violate the FCA because he did not
cause the mortgages to go into default and thus result in damage to the government, the case is an early
example of the certification theory of liability. Id. at 352. According to the dissent:
There can be no question but that Hibbs, as to the six properties in question, made
false certifications concerning their condition to the FHA. The FHA relied on these
statements in issuing its mortgage insurance and had the statements not been false,
FHA insurance would not have issued regarding the six mortgages in question. It
is clear that the defaults by the mortgagors on these six properties were not caused
by nor were they in any way related to the conditions that were the subject of Hibbs’
false certifications.
Id. at 353 (Meanor, J., dissenting).
49. See BOESE, supra note 26, § 2.03, at 2-121. Unlike a legally false claim, a factually false claim is
false on its face without the need to reference the underlying statute or regulation. Id.
50. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 696.
51. See Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217.
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certifications are made where the defendant is required to expressly
certify compliance with a particular statute or regulation to obtain
payment from the government. 52 The focus is on the defendant’s actual
statements and what effect those certifications have on the
government’s decision to pay. 53 Second, implied false certifications
are those implied by the law from the defendant’s silence regarding its
noncompliance with underlying statutes and regulations. 54 The
emphasis shifts to whether compliance with the underlying rules is
necessary to entitle government payment.55 The theory of implied false
certification is based on the premise that when an entity submits a
claim for payment to the government, the entity is certifying
compliance with all of the legal prerequisites that make it eligible to
be paid.56 Defendants in noncompliance with the necessary statutes or
regulations that the government reimburses violate the FCA even
though they have not made any express statements of compliance. 57 In
effect, liability through implied certification rests on the failure to
disclose material noncompliance with the law rather than the

52. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 698. A defendant makes express certification where it makes a claim that
“falsely certifies compliance with a particular statute, regulation or contractual term, where compliance is
a prerequisite to payment.” Id.
53. Express certifications are often made on claim forms submitted to the government. Id. For
example, to obtain Medicare reimbursement, a physician has to certify on the HCFA-1500 form that “the
services shown on this form were medically indicated and necessary for the health of the patient and were
personally furnished by me or were furnished incident to my professional service by my employee under
my immediate personal supervision.” Id.; see also Conner, 543 F.3d at 1218 (plaintiff’s premising an
express certification theory on a hospital’s annual cost report to Medicare); Krause, supra note 14, at 1817
(“Express certification applies when a defendant makes an explicitly false certification of compliance with
an underlying program condition, such as by signing a false certification statement on an invoice.”).
Express certifications are made to the underlying prerequisite statutes and regulations. Id.
54. See Conner, 543 F.3d at 1218 (“Under an implied false certification theory, by contrast, courts do
not look to the contractor’s actual statements; rather, the analysis focuses on the underlying contracts,
statutes, or regulations themselves to ascertain whether they make compliance a prerequisite to the
government’s payment.” (first citing United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214
F.3d 1372, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2000); and then citing Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519,
531–33 (10th Cir. 2000))).
55. Id.
56. See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699 (“An implied false certification claim is based on the notion that the
act of submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance with governing federal rules that
are a precondition to payment.”).
57. See Krause, supra note 14, at 1817.
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affirmative or explicit statements required to obtain payment from the
government.58
B. Implied Certification Before Escobar
The origin of implied certification can be traced back to Ab-Tech
Construction, Inc. v. United States.59 In Ab-Tech Construction, Inc.,
the Court of Federal Claims found that when the defendant submitted
progress payment vouchers to the government, it impliedly certified
compliance with all requirements of participation in the Small
Business Administration (SBA) program.60 By entering into a
subcontract with another construction company—which the SBA
program prohibited—the payment vouchers submitted by the
defendant were false because the court reasoned that the government
paid the defendant with the mistaken belief that the government was
furthering the goals of the program. 61
In the decades following Ab-Tech Construction, Inc., relators and
defense counsel as well as the courts of appeals disagreed over the
legitimacy and scope of implied certification. 62 The healthcare
58. Id. Professor Krause draws the distinction between a defendant’s explicit misrepresentation and
the defendant’s silence regarding failure to comply with conditions. Id. “Sometimes, we lie when we
speak; sometimes, we lie when we don’t.” Id. at 1812.
59. 31 Fed. Cl. 429 (1994), aff’d per curiam, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished table
decision); see Krause, supra note 14, at 1818; Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699.
60. See Ab-Tech, 31 Fed. Cl. at 434. The Court of Federal Claims first applied the implied false
certification theory of liability where a contractor had breached the terms of the SBA program:
Seen from this broader perspective, Ab-Tech’s claims clearly were fraudulent. The
payment vouchers represented an implied certification by Ab-Tech of its
continuing adherence to the requirements for participation in the 8(a) program.
Therefore, by deliberately withholding from SBA knowledge of the prohibited
contract arrangement with [a subcontractor], Ab-Tech not only dishonored the
terms of its agreement with that agency but, more importantly, caused the
Government to pay out funds in the mistaken belief that it was furthering the aims
of the 8(a) program. In short, the Government was duped by Ab-Tech’s active
concealment of a fact vital to the integrity of that program. The withholding of such
information—information critical to the decision to pay—is the essence of a false
claim.
Id.
61. Id. (“The withholding of such information—information critical to the decision to pay—is the
essence of a false claim.”).
62. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1998–99 (2016);
see also Stephens, supra note 7 (analyzing circuit split regarding implied certification in the decades
leading up to Escobar).
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industry was particularly concerned that implied certification would
impose substantial FCA liability for minor violations of one of the
hundreds of regulations which providers must comply with.63 To limit
the scope of the theory, a number of circuit courts held that a relator
may bring an implied certification claim only where the government
labels the relevant statute or regulation as an “express condition of
payment”; that is, the language of the regulation explicitly states that
the defendant must comply to be entitled to government
reimbursement.64 The most frequently cited case that adopted this view
was Mikes v. Straus in the Second Circuit (the Mikes standard).65 To
hold otherwise, according to this view, would turn the FCA into a
“general ‘enforcement device’ for federal statutes, regulations, and
contracts.”66 Other courts followed the natural progression of the
theory from Ab-Tech Construction, Inc. and held that the theory
applies when a defendant submits a claim and fails to disclose that it
is in violation of relevant statutes and regulations. 67 Finally, there were
courts that rejected the theory all together on the basis that implied
certification imposed blanket FCA liability.68
C. The Court Finds a Balance: Universal Health Services, Inc. v.
63. See BOESE, supra note 26, § 2.03, at 2-128; Meador & Warren, supra note 35, at 456; Anikeeff &
Ball, supra note 12.
64. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700 (“[I]mplied false certification is appropriately applied only when the
underlying statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly states the provider must comply
in order to be paid.” (citing United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372,
1376 (D.C. Cir. 2000))). The term “express condition of payment” should not be confused with “express
false certification.” The former relates to what label the government puts on the underlying statute or
regulation, specifically whether it explicitly says that the defendant must comply to be eligible for
payment. Krause, supra note 14, at 1822 n.62. Express false certification describes the defendant’s explicit
statements made to induce the government to pay a claim. See id.
65. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700.
66. United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 268–69 (5th Cir. 2010) (first
quoting United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir.
1997); and then citing Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699) (“The prerequisite requirement has to do with more than
just the materiality of a false certification; it ultimately has to do with whether it is fair to find a false
certification or false claim for payment in the first place.”).
67. Stephens, supra note 7, at 281; see also United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc.,
647 F.3d 377, 387–88 (1st Cir. 2011) (declining to follow the Mikes standard because the text of the FCA
does not require conditions of payment to be explicit in statutory or regulatory language).
68. See United States ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc., 764 F.3d 699, 712 (7th
Cir. 2014) (“[E]ven a single regulatory violation would be a condition of any and all payments
subsequently received . . . [,which] would be [an] absurd [result].” (citation omitted)).
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United States ex rel. Escobar
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Escobar to resolve the
circuit split over implied certification.69 The dispute at the center of
Escobar involved a mental health facility owned and operated by the
defendant, Universal Health Services, that employed unlicensed and
untrained staff members who treated the plaintiffs’ daughter.70 The
plaintiffs’ implied certification theory alleged that defendant Universal
Health Services, Inc. submitted reimbursement claims to the
Massachusetts Medicaid program despite flagrantly violating staff
qualification regulations and licensing requirements.71 Writing the
unanimous decision, Justice Thomas put an end to the disagreement
among the circuits and held that implied certification is a legitimate
theory of FCA liability.72 Additionally, the Court disagreed with the
Mikes standard that applies implied certification only when the
defendant violates a contractual, statutory, or regulatory provision that
the government has designated an express condition of payment. 73
69. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (2016).
70. Id. at 1997. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that their daughter had an adverse reaction to
medication prescribed by one of the unlicensed employees and eventually died after suffering a seizure.
Id.
71. Id. at 1997–98. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that staff members misrepresented their
qualifications and licensing statuses to the government in order to obtain National Provider Identification
(NPI) numbers that can be submitted with claims to Medicare and state Medicaid programs for financial
reimbursement:
The operative complaint asserts that Universal Health (acting through Arbour)
submitted reimbursement claims that made representations about the specific
services provided by specific types of professionals, but that failed to disclose
serious violations of regulations pertaining to staff qualifications and licensing
requirements for these services. . . . Universal Health allegedly flouted these
regulations because Arbour employed unqualified, unlicensed, and unsupervised
staff. The Massachusetts Medicaid program, unaware of these deficiencies, paid
the claims. Universal Health thus allegedly defrauded the program, which would
not have reimbursed the claims had it known that it was billed for mental health
services that were performed by unlicensed and unsupervised staff.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 2001. Justice Thomas, writing for the unanimous Court, established that a relator can
establish FCA liability under the implied certification theory of liability where “first, the claim does not
merely request payment, but also makes specific representations about the goods or services provided;
and second, the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or
contractual requirements makes those representations misleading half-truths.” Id.
73. Id. (“The second question presented is whether, as Universal Health urges, a defendant should face
False Claims Act liability only if it fails to disclose the violation of a contractual, statutory, or regulatory
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Escobar was not, however, a complete victory for the government
and potential relators. Although rejecting one barrier to the
applicability of implied certification, the Court in Escobar imposed
another barrier of its own.74 The policy concerns from defendants over
the reach of implied certification were quelled with an emphasis on the
FCA’s materiality requirement. 75 The “demanding” materiality
requirement, according to Justice Thomas, reinforces the idea that the
FCA “is not an ‘all-purpose antifraud statute[]’ . . . or a vehicle for
punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory
violations.”76 Instead, the defendant’s noncompliance with the
underlying contractual, statutory, or regulatory rules must be
substantial to satisfy the FCA’s materiality standard.77 The Court
provided additional guidance over the circumstances that may satisfy
the FCA’s “demanding” materiality standard:
[P]roof of materiality can include, but is not necessarily
limited to, evidence that the defendant knows that the
Government consistently refuses to pay claims in the mine
run of cases based on noncompliance with the particular
provision that the Government expressly designated a condition of payment. We conclude that the Act
does not impose this limit on liability.”). This theory was held by the Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits and is commonly referred to as the Mikes theory. See Stephens, supra note 7; see also
Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[I]mplied false certification is appropriately applied
only when the underlying statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly states the provider
must comply in order to be paid.” (citing United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.,
214 F.3d 1372, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2000))), overruled by Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex
rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
74. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002–04 (“As noted, a misrepresentation about compliance with a
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the Government’s payment decision
in order to be actionable under the False Claims Act. We now clarify how that materiality requirement
should be enforced.”).
75. Id. Although Justice Thomas recognizes the policy implications of implied certification in
rejecting Universal Health’s “express condition” limitation, he nevertheless held that “policy arguments
cannot supersede clear statutory text.” Id. at 2002 (citing Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 55 n.4 (2012)).
The fear of broad FCA liability under the implied certification theory of liability could instead be policed
by the FCA’s materiality requirement. Id.
76. Id. at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008),
superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123
Stat. 1617).
77. Id. Materiality “cannot be found where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.” Id. (first citing
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 543 (1943); and then citing Junius Constr. Co. v.
Cohen, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (N.Y. 1931)).
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statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement.
Conversely, if the Government pays a particular claim in full
despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were
violated, that is very strong evidence that those requirements
are not material. Or, if the Government regularly pays a
particular type of claim in full despite actual knowledge that
certain requirements were violated, and has signaled no
change in position, that is strong evidence that the
requirements are not material. 78
Escobar is unique in that there is no clear winner. 79 The Supreme
Court vastly expanded the FCA’s reach by legitimizing implied
certification at the same time it imposed the “demanding” barrier of
materiality.80 Yet, for all of the legal clarity Escobar sought to impose,
there remains considerable disagreement as to its proper application. 81
II. ANALYSIS
Consider again the private company that constructs the office
building for the United States.82 After Escobar, can the company be
certain that the imported nails will not mean years of litigation that will
end with a substantial financial penalty? 83 Remember, “those who do
business with the government should turn square corners.”84 But
Escobar also seems to require the government to treat “squarely” those
who obtain money even though the law says they are not eligible to be
78. Id. at 2003–04.
79. See Krause, supra note 14, at 1844.
80. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002–04.
81. See Krause, supra note 14. Escobar left open the question whether its heightened materiality
analysis applies to all theories of liability, not just implied certification. Id.
82. See supra INTRODUCTION.
83. In an FCA case brought under an implied certification theory, the damage to the United States is
the amount the defendant was paid based on the alleged misrepresentation over the compliance with the
underlying statutes, regulations, or contractual terms. See Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health
Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2002). In this
hypothetical, the company could be subject to FCA liability for using imported nails.
84. United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 1977). Justice Holmes’s quotation reminds
private contractors that if the government “attaches even purely formal conditions . . . those conditions
must be complied with.” Rock Island A. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
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paid.85 From the standpoint of the company, the imported nails surely
qualify as a “garden-variety” breach that is not sufficient to impose
FCA liability.86 But recall that the company has not made a mere
misrepresentation by omission—it has expressly certified to the
government that it has only used American-made nails.87 If the
government brings an FCA case against the company under an express
false certification theory, can the government be sure that it will not be
defeated by Escobar’s stringent test for materiality?88
In the years following Escobar, federal courts have employed
various theories to confront this conundrum. 89 Some have limited the
reach of Escobar strictly to those cases arising under the implied false
certification theory of liability. 90 Others have added considerable
confusion and litigation by extending Escobar to all “legally false”
theories, including express false certifications. 91 Relators and the
government, sometimes experiencing opposite results within the same
district, have borne the brunt of these competing theories. 92 The
85. Hibbs, 568 F.2d at 349 (“This appeal is by one who disregarded that warning but now asks that
the government be required to treat him squarely in an action under the False Claims Act.”); see also
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662,
672 (2008), superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-21, 123 Stat. 1617).
86. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003.
87. See supra INTRODUCTION.
88. See supra Section I.C.
89. See infra Section II.A; see also infra Section II.B.
90. See United States ex rel. Wood v. Allergan, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 772, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[T]he
Supreme Court did not address the theory of express certification. Thus, there is no reason to believe
Escobar modified or eliminated existing law . . . pertaining to that theory of falsity.”), rev’d on other
grounds, 899 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2018).
91. See United States v. Strock, No. 15-CV-0887, 2018 WL 647471, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018)
(Escobar applies to “all misrepresentations of compliance with statutory, regulatory or contractual
requirements brought under the Act—not only those brought under an implied certification theory”).
92. Compare United States ex rel. Lorona v. Infilaw Corp., No. 15-cv-959-J-34, 2019 WL 3778389,
at *17 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2019) (finding relator’s express certification claim defeated because Escobar’s
materiality analysis is critical “as to both express and implied certifications”), with United States ex rel.
Stepe v. RS Compounding LLC, No. 13-cv-3150-T-33, 2017 WL 5178183, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2017)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that Escobar applies to all theories of liability for the view that it applies
only to “the judicially-imposed materiality requirement for . . . implied-false certification claims” (citing
United States ex rel. Patel v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 14-cv-120-T-33, 2017 WL 4310263, at *9 (M.D.
Fla. Sept 28, 2017)); United States v. DaVita Inc., No. 18-cv-01250, 2020 WL 3064771, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 10, 2020) (Escobar’s heightened materiality analysis applies to an FCA claim “regardless of whether
it is based upon express or implied false certifications”), with United States ex rel. Dresser v. Qualium
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disparity results from the lack of clarity from the Supreme Court’s
decision.93 But the courts of appeals have been equally silent on the
correct application of Escobar.94 The clearest answer appeared in the
Second Circuit in Bishop v. Wells Fargo, where the court remanded a
case brought under an express certification theory because the district
court did not apply the newly articulated Escobar standard.95 In United
States v. Strock, the Court of Appeals upheld the standard articulated
in Bishop, which is evidence that the “demanding” materiality inquiry
applies to all FCA claims in the Second Circuit—including those
premised by an express certification.96 Other courts have hinted that
Escobar is limited only to the cases brought under an implied false
certification theory of liability.97 For example, in United States v.
Corp., No. 12-cv-01745, 2016 WL 3880763, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016) (allowing relator’s
complaint to proceed with express-certification allegations but granting defendant’s motion to dismiss
implied-certification claims because they do not meet Escobar’s standard); United States ex rel. Jackson
v. DePaul Health Sys., 454 F. Supp. 3d 481, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (granting motion for summary judgment
on express certification claim on the basis that “[w]hether a false certification is express or implied, it
must be ‘material to the Government’s payment decision’ for liability to attach.” (quoting United States
ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880 F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2018))), with United States ex rel.
Schimelpfenig v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys Ltd., No. 11-4607, 2017 WL 1133956, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27,
2017) (suggesting that relator’s claim would have survived motion to dismiss if it was based on express
rather than implied-certification theory).
93. See Krause, supra note 14.
94. United States ex rel. Nedza v. Am. Imaging Mgmt., Inc., No. 15 C 6937, 2020 WL 1469448, at
*10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2020) (“[A]s far as this Court can tell, neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh
Circuit has explicitly said that Escobar’s materiality requirement extends to all types of FCA claims.”).
95. See Bishop v. Wells Fargo & Co., 870 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The First and
Third Circuits have also come close to articulating a standard but not as close to as that of the Second
Circuit. See Guilfoile v. Shields, 913 F.3d 178, 187 (1st Cir. 2019) (suggesting that “express or implied
false representation[s] of compliance” are subject to Escobar); United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol.,
PC, 923 F.3d 308, 317 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Escobar . . . held that ‘materiality is an element of all FCA
claims. . . .’”).
96. See generally United States v. Strock, 982 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2020). In Strock, the government
appealed the district court’s dismissal of its claim based on both an express false certification and a fraud
in the inducement theory of liability. Id. at 58. Under the theory of fraud in the inducement, the defendant
makes fraudulent misrepresentations in the procurement of a contract with the government and is liable
under the FCA even if the actual claims submitted are factual because, as the theory posits, the claims are
derived from the original fraudulent misrepresentations. Id. at 60. On appeal, the Second Circuit narrowed
its analysis to the government’s fraud in the inducement theory but still applied the Escobar materiality
inquiry. Id. at 60–61. Therefore, law in the Second Circuit seems to be that Escobar’s materiality inquiry
applies to all FCA claims, not just to implied false certifications. Id. at 62.
97. See United States v. Melgen, 967 F.3d 1250, 1259 (11th Cir. 2020). In Melgen, the defendant
argued that the jury instruction for materiality given in the district court was based on an objective standard
and that Escobar created a new and more subjective standard. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Badr v.
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Melgen, the Eleventh Circuit refused to extend Escobar’s materiality
analysis to a criminal fraud case because implied false certification is
“quite a different question,” and Escobar “was geared toward
addressing that issue.”98 What is clear, in the case of the hypothetical
construction company, is that the outcome of an FCA case brought
under a legally false theory of liability likely depends on which circuit
the case is filed in.99
Part II of this Note analyzes how courts have assessed materiality
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar. Section A discusses the
courts that have chosen to extend Escobar’s stringent test for
materiality to cases brought under the express certification theory of
liability.100 Section B analyzes the cases under which Escobar is
limited only to those cases brought under the implied certification
theory.101 Finally, Section C discusses the nature of materiality under
the FCA before and after Escobar with a close look at the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Triple Canopy to illustrate the
proper purpose and scope of the Escobar’s materiality standard.102
A. The End of the “Garden-Variety” Breach: Escobar Applied

Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. dismissed, 138 S. Ct. 370 (2017) (mem.).
The court in Triple Canopy emphasized that Escobar serves to guard against abuse of the implied false
certification theory. See infra Section II.C.3.
98. Melgen, 967 F.3d at 1259. The Court in Melgen notes that the Fourth Circuit reached a similar
answer on the question of whether Escobar should be applied in criminal fraud cases:
In two cases since Escobar, the Fourth Circuit has examined whether the precise
statement from Escobar that Melgen latches onto actually alters the long-standing
objective materiality standard in criminal fraud cases. According to that court?
Doubtful. Like the Fourth Circuit, we think it unlikely that “the Court’s
examination of how materiality applies under ‘implied false certification’ FCA
cases transfers to all cases charging fraud, or even all cases charging health care
fraud.”
Id. at 1259–60 (first citing United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 619–20 (4th Cir. 2017); and then citing
United States v. Palin, 874 F.3d 418, 423 (4th Cir. 2017)).
99. See United States ex rel. Wood v. Allergan, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 772, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), rev’d
on other grounds, 899 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2018). But see United States ex rel. Arnstein v. Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3702, 2019 WL 1245656, at *7 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 27, 2019) (“The Supreme Court
effectively abolished the need to divide cases into ‘express’ and ‘implied’ certifications . . . .”). Both
Allergan and Teva Pharmaceuticals were decided in the Southern District of New York.
100. See infra Section II.A.
101. See infra Section II.B.
102. See infra Section II.C.
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Broadly Across the FCA
It is of course no secret that the Supreme Court had policy
considerations in mind when it imposed the “demanding” materiality
standard in Escobar.103 Even though the Court disagreed with the
Mikes decision, where the implied certification theory should only
apply when the underlying statutes or regulations are express
conditions of payment, the heightened materiality inquiry is merely a
substitute policy consideration with the goal of cabining liability.104 If
the main takeaway from Escobar is the Court’s proclamation that the
FCA “is not an all-purpose antifraud statute” or “a vehicle for
punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory
violations[,]” the line of cases that have extended Escobar to express
certifications begins to make sense. 105
1. Express Certification Claims Failing Escobar’s Test
Despite the lack of clear guidance from the circuit courts, some
district courts have not hesitated to apply the Escobar standard to
express certifications.106 Following the Second Circuit’s decision in
Bishop, the district court in United States v. Strock decided that all of

103. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2004 (2016)
(“[I]f the Government required contractors to aver their compliance with the entire U.S. Code and Code
of Federal Regulations, then under this view, failing to mention noncompliance with any of those
requirements would always be material. The False Claims Act does not adopt such an extraordinarily
expansive view of liability.”).
104. See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001), overruled by Universal Health Servs., Inc.
v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016); Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (“Universal Health
nonetheless contends that False Claims Act liability should be limited to undisclosed violations of
expressly designated conditions of payment to provide defendants with fair notice and to cabin liability.
But policy arguments cannot supersede the clear statutory text.” (citing Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41,
55 n.4 (2012))). The Court instead chose to cabin liability through the FCA’s materiality requirement. Id.
(“Moreover, other parts of the False Claims Act allay Universal Health’s concerns. ‘[I]nstead of adopting
a circumscribed view of what it means for a claim to be false or fraudulent,’ concerns about fair notice
and open-ended liability ‘can be effectively addressed through strict enforcement of the Act’s materiality
and scienter requirements.’” (quoting United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1270
(D.C. Cir. 2010))).
105. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S.
662, 672 (2008), superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617).
106. The circuit courts have mostly been silent as to whether Escobar should apply to all FCA claims,
including those arising under an express certification theory. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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the government’s claims—those based on express certification,
implied certification, and fraud in the inducement—had to survive
scrutiny under Escobar.107 Bishop’s conclusion convinced the court
that Escobar created a standard of materiality for all FCA claims that
was “divorced from any mention that the requirement applies only to
specific theories of falsity.”108 Equally persuasive was the Second
Circuit’s opinion that express certifications “could ‘be effectively
addressed through strict enforcement of the [FCA]’s materiality and
scienter requirements.’”109 With the Escobar materiality standard in
mind, the Strock court put the government’s express certification
claims through each of the indicia of materiality laid out in Escobar.110
The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss after determining
that none of the factors in Escobar militated in favor of materiality,
despite multiple express certifications from the defendant that it was
in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.111 The Second
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on appeal but only after
deciding that the government had plausibly plead materiality under
Escobar.112 As a result of Strock, the law in the Second Circuit seems
to be that Escobar’s materiality inquiry applies to all theories of
liability under the FCA.113

107. United States v. Strock, No. 15-CV-0887, 2018 WL 647471, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018)
(“Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Escobar’s materiality standard applies to all of
Plaintiff’s claims brought under § 3729(a)(1)(A) regardless of whether those claims were brought under
a theory of implied false certification, express false certification, or fraudulent inducement.”). Under the
theory of fraud in the inducement, the defendant’s claims, even if they are factually accurate, are false
because they are derived from fraudulent misrepresentations in procurement of the contract with the
government. Id. at *8.
108. Id. at *11 (quoting Bishop v. Wells Fargo & Co., 870 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)).
109. Id. (quoting Bishop, 870 F.3d at 107). This language from Bishop is quoted from the Escobar
opinion. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (quoting Sci. Applications, 626 F.3d at 1270).
110. Strock, 2018 WL 647471, at *8–10. In Strock, the court focused primarily on the government’s
decision to make compliance with the underlying regulations a condition of payment, the defendant’s
knowledge that the government consistently refuses to pay claims in most cases based on the
noncompliance with the underlying regulations, and the evidence that the government pays the claim in
full despite actual knowledge of the defendant’s noncompliance. Id. at *8–9.
111. Id. at *10. The defendant’s alleged certifications included a representation of compliance in the
initial contract with the government, a certification in an online database that it qualified under the
government program, and an outright false statement made to the VA that it was qualified to participate
in the program. Id. at *9.
112. United States v. Strock, 982 F.3d 51, 65 (2d Cir. 2020).
113. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss2/13

24

Summerlin: Determining the Appropriate Reach of Escobar's Materiality Standard: Implied and Express Certification

2022]

DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE REACH

595

Not all courts that have chosen to expand Escobar to encompass
express certifications have undertaken the extensive analysis as the
court undertook in Strock.114 In fact, some courts have disposed of the
matter in a single sentence.115 Although short shrift over the issue may
seem harmless, failing to distinguish between express and implied
certifications can have tangible negative consequences for an FCA
case.116 After agreeing that a relator had sufficiently plead an express
certification claim to survive a motion for summary judgement, the
court in United States ex rel. Jackson v. DePaul Health System
determined that the certification, “[w]hether . . . express or implied,”
had to be put through Escobar’s test for materiality.117 Even though
the court agreed with the relator that a reasonable jury could find
support for the express certification claim, the court reached the
opposite conclusion for the materiality of the same claim after
applying the Escobar standard.118 Had the relator brought the claim in
a different court, the outcome might have been different. 119
2. Condition of Payment: Relevant or Irrelevant?
Perhaps the strongest support for Escobar’s broad applicability
comes from the Supreme Court’s holding that “[w]hat matters is not
114. The district court in Strock devoted an entire section of its analysis to consider the Second Circuit’s
opinion in Bishop in determining whether to apply the materiality standard to the government’s express
false certification claims. Strock, 2018 WL 647471, at *11.
115. United States ex rel. Jackson v. DePaul Health Sys., 454 F. Supp. 3d 481, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2020)
(“Whether a false certification is express or implied, it must be ‘material to the Government’s payment
decision’ for liability to attach.” (quoting United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880
F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2018))); United States ex rel. Lacey v. Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., No. 14-cv-5739,
2017 WL 5515860, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2017) (“For a relator to make out a violation of the FCA
under a legally false theory, it must be shown that the misrepresentation about compliance is ‘material’ to
the government’s decision to pay.” (quoting Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,
136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016))); United States ex rel. Gelbman v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-771, 2018
WL 4761575, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018) (“For a relator to state an FCA claim under a legally false
theory, he must show that the misrepresentation about compliance is ‘material’ to the Government’s
decision to pay.” (quoting Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002–03)), aff’d, 790 F. App’x 244 (2d Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 1296 (2020) (mem.).
116. Jackson, 454 F. Supp. 3d at 502.
117. Id. at 500.
118. Id. (“Even if [the defendant] had made false certifications regarding compliance with federal or
state regulations, [the relator] has not provided sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact that these certifications are material.”).
119. See infra Section II.B.
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the label the Government attaches to a requirement, but whether the
defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows
is material to the Government’s payment decision.”120 This part of
Escobar’s holding was a repudiation of Mikes’s and other circuits’
“express condition of payment” principle.121 Instead, the Court
considered the government’s label of a condition of payment as
relevant but not dispositive of materiality and added it to the holistic
set of factors, which now constitutes the heightened materiality
standard.122 This proposition taken to its most extreme would seem to
suggest that even the most egregious violations of law, even those
which the government has made compliance with mandatory to receive
payment, could be permissible as long as the alleged noncompliance
is not material.123 Not surprisingly, the district courts that have
extended Escobar to express certification claims have relied heavily
on this passage.124
In United States ex rel. Arnstein v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,
the relator argued that the defendant’s express certifications of
compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) were material as a
matter of law and therefore did not need to withstand the rigorous
materiality requirement under Escobar.125 The relator relied on 2010
amendments to the AKS to the extent that “violation of [the AKS]
constitutes a false or fraudulent claim for purposes of [the FCA].”126
The court agreed with the relator, but only with regard to the claims
that arose after the 2010 AKS amendments.127 The express
120. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996.
121. Id. at 2001 (“The second question presented is whether, as Universal Health urges, a defendant
should face False Claims Act liability only if it fails to disclose the violation of a contractual, statutory,
or regulatory provision that the Government expressly designated a condition of payment. We conclude
that the Act does not impose this limit on liability. But we also conclude that not every undisclosed
violation of an express condition of payment automatically triggers liability. Whether a provision is
labeled a condition of payment is relevant to but not dispositive of the materiality inquiry.”).
122. Id. at 2001, 2003.
123. Id. at 1996 (“[E]ven when a requirement is expressly designated a condition of payment, not every
violation of such a requirement gives rise to liability.”).
124. United States ex rel. Arnstein v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3702, 2019 WL 1245656,
at *32–33 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2019).
125. Id. at *28.
126. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g)).
127. Id. (“I agree as to one subset of claims: those that Teva . . . caused to be presented in violation of
subsection . . . 3729(a)(1)(A) and . . . were submitted after March 23, 2010.”).
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certification claims that arose before the 2010 AKS amendments,
according to the court, had to face scrutiny under Escobar.128 Even
though the pre-2010 claims had to make an express certification of
compliance with the AKS to be eligible for payment from the Medicare
program, the court ultimately concluded that this evidence was “weak
proof of materiality” under Escobar’s determination that express
conditions of payment are “relevant [to] but not dispositive of the
materiality inquiry.”129
Luckily for the relator in Teva Pharmaceuticals, the court ultimately
found its pre-2010 express certifications sufficiently material to
survive a motion for summary judgement based on other Escobar
indicia of materiality. 130 Other relators have not been as fortunate. 131
The relator in United States ex rel. Mei Ling v. City of Los Angeles
argued that the City’s express certifications of compliance with
housing accessibility laws, which were conditions of eligibility for
housing grants from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), were material because “Congress itself
identified the violated requirements as conditions of payment.”132
Citing Escobar, the court disagreed and found the fact that Congress
made the requirement a condition of payment “not dispositive of the
materiality inquiry.”133

128. Id.
129. Id. at *33 (“Although this evidence would have been persuasive when Mikes controlled, it is weak
proof of materiality after Escobar . . . .”). The defendant, in order to receive Medicare reimbursement,
had to expressly certify on CMS Form 855S that it “understand[s] that payment of a claim by Medicare
is conditioned upon the claim and the underlying transaction complying with such laws, regulations and
program instructions (including, but not limited to, the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute[.]).” Id. at *32
(second alteration in original). Additionally, the defendant had to expressly certify to CMS compliance
with “[f]ederal laws and regulations designed to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, including but not limited
to applicable provisions of Federal criminal law, the False Claims Act . . . and the anti-kickback
statute . . . .” Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
130. Arnstein, 2019 WL 1245656, at *33.
131. United States ex rel. Mei Ling v. City of L.A., No. CV 11-974, 2018 WL 3814498, at *22 (C.D.
Cal. July 25, 2018); United States ex rel. Folliard v. Comstor Corp., No. 11-731, 2018 WL 5777085, at
*7–8 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2018).
132. Mei Ling, 2018 WL 3814498, at *2, *13. The City of Los Angeles expressly certified in multiple
grant applications to HUD that it complied with federal housing accessibility laws. Id. at *3. The relator
brought the FCA case after a HUD “consistently observed accessibility deficiencies throughout the
various units, developments, designated accessible routes and common areas.” Id.
133. Id. at *13.
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The relator in United States ex rel. Folliard v. Comstor Corp. fared
no better.134 In Folliard, the defendant was required to expressly
certify compliance with the federal Trade Agreement Act (TAA) to
contract with the government to supply communication technology. 135
Again, the relator insisted the compliance with the TAA was
“inherently material” because “Congress passed the TAA, and
Congress controls federal spending.”136 The court disagreed with the
argument that compliance was material as a matter of law because
Escobar does not care what label “the Government attaches to a
requirement[.]”137 The relators in both Mei Ling and Folliard staked
the materiality of their express certification claims on the fact that
Congress itself labeled compliance with federal law a condition of
payment.138 When relators and the government lose under this strict
interpretation of Escobar, the question of materiality is taken away
from the will and intent of Congress and given to the courts.139
3. United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortgage Investors Corp.: A
Case Study
United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortgage Investors Corp. provides an
illustrative example of the constitutional issues that can arise when
courts decide, as a matter of law, that an express certification of
compliance is not material under Escobar.140 In Bibby, the relators
alleged that the defendant mortgage lender orchestrated a fraudulent
scheme that involved charging veteran mortgage borrowers hidden
134. Folliard, 2018 WL 5777085, at *8.
135. Id. at *1. The TAA required that products supplied to the government under the contract be
“[American]-made or designated country end products.” Id.
136. Id. at *7.
137. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996 (“What matters is not the label the Government attaches to a
requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is
material to the Government’s payment decision.”); see also Folliard, 2018 WL 5777085, at *7 (“[A]
condition’s source is separate from its materiality. ‘A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely
because the Government designates compliance with a particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual
requirement as a condition of payment.’” (quoting Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003)).
138. Folliard, 2018 WL 5777085, at *8; Mei Ling, 2018 WL 3814498, at *22.
139. See infra Section III.B.
140. United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., No. 12-CV-04020, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
232351 (N.D. Ga. July 1, 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 987 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 209
L. Ed. 2d 757 (2021) (mem.).
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closing costs in violation of federal law and Veterans Administration
(VA) regulations.141 The defendant, a private mortgage lender, utilized
a VA program that allowed military veterans to refinance their
mortgages with loans guaranteed by the government at favorable
interest rates.142 If the veteran eventually defaulted on the mortgage,
the government, as the guaranty, had to pay the remaining balance to
the mortgage lender.143
To participate in the VA program, the mortgage lender had to
expressly certify that it was not charging unallowable closing costs to
the veteran borrower.144 In fact, the VA regulations were very clear in
stating that the mortgage lender could not participate in the program
without its certification of compliance. 145 The relators pointed to the
fact that the VA expressly conditioned participation in the program on
the defendant’s certification, and thus payment through the guaranty
was in itself “proof [that] the requirement is material under the
FCA.”146
The court, citing Escobar, found that the VA’s condition of
obtaining the guarantee was relevant to materiality but was only “one
piece of the puzzle” under Escobar.147 The court went on to find the
141. Id. at *2–3.
142. Id.
143. Complaint at 13–14, Bibby, No. 12-CV-04020.
144. Bibby, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232351, at *42–43.
145. Id. Mortgage lenders, to be eligible to participate in the VA loan program and sell a
government-guaranteed loan to a veteran borrower, had to certify on every form submitted to the
government that:
No charge shall be made against, or paid by, the borrower incident to the making
of a guaranteed or insured loan other than those expressly permitted under
paragraph (d) or (e) of this section, and no loan shall be guaranteed or insured
unless the lender certifies to the Secretary that it has not imposed and will not
impose any charges or fees against the borrower in excess of those permissible
under paragraph (d) or (e) of this section.
38 C.F.R. § 36.4313(a) (2020).
146. Bibby, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232351, at *43 (“The fact that federal regulations make a truthful
certification of compliance a condition precedent to the guaranty, and establish that fraud and
misrepresentation are grounds for a complete defense to making payment on the guaranty, proves MIC’s
fraudulent certifications of compliance are material under the FCA.”).
147. Id. at *46–47. Instead, the court relied on Escobar’s holding that the government’s label of a
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement as an express condition of payment was not dispositive
of materiality:
However, Relators fare no better in their attempt to characterize this regulatory
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other factors outlined in Escobar as more persuasive of the materiality
inquiry.148 Specifically, the court treated the VA’s knowledge of the
impermissible closing costs and acquiescence to the lender’s conduct
as strong evidence of immateriality.149 The court went on to grant the
defendant’s motion for summary judgement because the mortgage
lender’s express certifications to the government were not material to
the government’s decision to guarantee the loan. 150 The court reached
this conclusion despite that the VA expressly conditioned participation
in the loan guaranty program on the mortgage lender’s certification
with specific VA regulations. 151 As discussed later in this Note, courts
that allow defendants to leverage Escobar against the express will of
Congress raise important questions about separation of powers.152
B. The Formal Approach: Escobar Limited to the Implied
Certification Context
A literal reading of Escobar suggests that the heightened materiality
analysis is limited to the implied certification context.153 The text of
the opinion reveals that the “case requires [the Court] to consider [the
implied certification] theory of liability and to clarify some of the

section as dispositive on the materiality issue. Contrary to Relators’ suggestion, the
mere fact that this regulatory section qualifies as a condition of obtaining a loan
guarantee does not lead to the inexorable conclusion that such a requirement is
material on that basis alone. To the contrary, the Supreme Court in Universal
Health made clear that “[a] misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely
because the Government designates compliance with a particular statutory,
regulatory, or contractual requirement as a condition of payment.” Rather, “the
Government’s decision to expressly identify a provision as a condition of payment
is relevant but not automatically dispositive.”
Id. (citations omitted).
148. Id. at *80.
149. Id. at *52 (“The VA’s apparent acquiescence—evidenced by its sole use of refunds to the exclusion
of other administrative sanctions, mandating indemnification, voiding the loan guarantee or reducing the
claim amount—to the widespread practice of lenders charging unallowable fees does not bode well for
Relators.”).
150. Id. at *86–87.
151. Id. at *42–43.
152. See infra Section III.B.
153. United States ex rel. Wood v. Allergan, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 772, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[T]he
Supreme Court did not address the theory of express certification.” (emphasis added)), rev’d on other
grounds, 899 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2018).
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circumstances in which the False Claims Act imposes liability.”154
Further, the Court’s two holdings might also suggest a narrow focus of
inquiry.155 First, when the Court legitimized the validity of implied
certification, it necessarily established the subject matter of the
decision.156 The Court’s second holding—that “failing to disclose
violations of legal requirements does not turn upon whether those
requirements were expressly designated as conditions of payment”—is
more instructive.157 Courts have long articulated the concept of
implied certification as the “active concealment” of important
information.158 The Court’s specific reference to liability for “failing
to disclose” suggests that the focus of Escobar’s materiality analysis
should be limited to implied certification cases.159
Not long after Escobar was decided, the district court in United
States ex rel. Wood v. Allergan, Inc. had the opportunity to apply the
Supreme Court’s newly minted test.160 There, the relator alleged that
the defendant pharmaceutical company expressly certified compliance
with the AKS on various Medicare and Medicaid claim forms as well
154. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (2016).
155. Id. at 1995.
156. Id. (“We first hold that, at least in certain circumstances, the implied false certification theory can
be a basis for liability.”).
157. Id. at 1996. This part of the Court’s holding is a response to the circuits who held that the implied
certification theory is only valid where the government designates the underlying contractual, statutory,
or regulatory requirements as an “express condition of payment.” See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700
(2d Cir. 2001) (holding that “implied false certification is appropriately applied only when the underlying
statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly states the provider must comply in order to
be paid.”), overruled by Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989
(2016). The Supreme Court in Escobar disagreed with this limitation of the implied certification theory
and instead imposed the “demanding” materiality requirement in an attempt to cabin liability. See
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004.
158. Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994), aff’d per curiam, 57 F.3d
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision).
159. The act of failing to disclose noncompliance with statutory, regulatory, and contractual
requirements has long been the language that describes liability under the implied certification theory. See
United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1267–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that
liability under an implied false certification theory depends on if the defendant “fails to disclose the
violation of a contractual condition that is material to the government’s decision to pay” (emphasis
added)); United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Liability for implied false certification attaches when “a claimant seeks and makes a claim for payment
from the Government without disclosing that it violated regulations that affected its eligibility for
payment.” (emphasis added)).
160. United States ex rel. Wood v. Allergan, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 772, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), rev’d on
other grounds, 899 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2018).
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as impliedly certified compliance with all “applicable Federal [and]
State laws” in other certifications to the government. 161 The court
prefaced its analysis of the relator’s false certification claims with the
“relevant takeaways” from Escobar that “the Supreme Court did not
address the theory of express certification” and that “there is no reason
to believe Escobar modified or eliminated existing law [] pertaining to
that theory of falsity.”162 From that vantage, the court separated the
express and implied certification claims into two distinct inquiries and
decided that the relator could proceed on both after it was clear that the
relator’s implied certification claims survived Escobar scrutiny.163
1. Express and Implied Certifications Treated as Separate and
Distinct Inquiries
The courts that have adopted the formal interpretation of Escobar
have similarly assessed the validity of implied and express false
certification claims as separate and distinct inquiries.164 In United
States v. Crumb, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss
after deciding that the government had plausibly pled falsity under
both an express and implied certification theory, with only the implied
certification claim receiving the Escobar materiality analysis. 165
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Lee v. Northern Adult Daily Health
Care Center, the court dismissed the relators’ express certification
theory but granted leave to amend claims based on implied
certification because “[w]hen the Amended Complaint was drafted,
Relators did not have the benefit of [Escobar’s] recent guidance on

161. Id. at 813.
162. Id. at 811.
163. Id. at 813–18. In Wood, the court altogether separates the analyses to the relator’s express and
implied certification claims. Id. But the court limited the Escobar materiality standard to the implied
certification analysis. Id. at 815–18.
164. See United States ex rel. Lee v. N. Adult Daily Health Care Ctr., 205 F. Supp. 3d 276, 293–96
(E.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v. Crumb, No. 15-0655, 2016 WL 4480690, at *23–24 (S.D. Ala. Aug.
24, 2016); United States ex rel. Dresser v. Qualium Corp., No. 12-cv-01745, 2016 WL 3880763, at *5–6
(N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016); United States v. Walgreen Co., 417 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1085–87 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
165. Crumb, 2016 WL 4480690, at *23 (The defendant challenged the government’s complaint “insofar
as the Government is proceeding on a theory of implied certifications, rather than express certifications.”).
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materiality.”166 The court limited the relators’ amended complaint only
to the implied certification claims. 167
Some courts have been willing to differentiate the two theories of
legal falsity even when the plaintiff fails to specifically plead under
either theory.168 For example, in United States v. Walgreen Co., the
court relied on a prior decision that interpreted implied certification to
conclude that the government’s claim could proceed under the theory,
reasoning that the government did not allege any “facially untruthful
statements” and that the defendant “omitted” that it was in violation of
relevant Illinois law.169 The court ultimately concluded that the
government’s implied certification claim failed under Escobar, but its
willingness to delineate between the two theories of legal falsity
remains illustrative of the formalistic theory of Escobar’s materiality
standard.170
2. Escobar Limited to Presentment Claims Under Section
3729(a)(1)(A)
Other courts, although still identifying the analytical differences
between express and implied certifications, go a step further and limit
Escobar’s materiality analysis only to implied certifications under a
certain subsection of fraud arising under the FCA.171 In United States
ex rel. Patel v. GE Healthcare, the court dismissed the relator’s
implied certification claim with leave to amend but disagreed with the
defendant that the amended claim had to satisfy Escobar scrutiny.172
The court held that because the relator’s claim was a “false statement[]
or record[]” claim brought under § 3729(a)(1)(B), and not a
166. Lee, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 296.
167. Id. The court in Qualium Corp. reached a nearly identical conclusion regarding the relator’s
implied certification claims. Qualium Corp., 2016 WL 3880763, at *6. The court granted the relator leave
to amend its implied certification claims in the wake of Escobar. Id.
168. Walgreen Co., 417 F. Supp. 3d at 1085 (“As an initial matter, the Government does not clarify
whether it brings its FCA claim under an express or implied false certification theory.”).
169. Id. at 1086 (citing United States ex rel. Lisitza v. Par Pharm. Cos., 276 F. Supp. 3d 779, 794 (N.D.
Ill. 2017)).
170. Id. at 1090.
171. See United States ex rel. Patel v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 14-120-T-33, 2017 WL 4310263, at *9
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2017).
172. Id.
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“presentment” claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A), it was not required to pass
muster under the heightened materiality standard.173 The court
reasoned that Escobar only applied to implied certifications brought
under presentment claims under § 3729(a)(1)(A).174 The justification
for the court’s holding is that false record claims under § 3729(a)(1)(B)
have an express materiality requirement in the statutory language,
unlike presentment claims where the statute is silent on materiality. 175
The court recognized that although implied certification is a
“judicially-imposed doctrine” designed “to ensure that only significant
omissions trigger the FCA’s considerable penalties,” the Supreme
Court’s Escobar analysis is limited to presentment claims because
materiality has to be imposed by the judge into the statutory
language.176

173. Id.
174. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G). The FCA identifies seven different types of fraud that give
rise to liability. Id. Presentment claims under § 3729(a)(1)(A) and false statement or record claims
under § 3729(a)(1)(B) “overlap significantly,” but they remain separate causes of action. See United
States ex rel. Hussain v. CDM Smith, Inc., No. 14-CV-9107, 2017 WL 4326523, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
27, 2017) (“Courts generally treat these two provisions together, as their elements overlap significantly.”
(first citing United States ex rel. Wood v. Allergan, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 772, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), rev’d
on other grounds, 899 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2018); and then citing United States ex rel. Kester v. Novartis
Pharms. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3d 242, 252–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). But see United States ex rel. Fallon v.
Accudyne Corp., 921 F. Supp. 611, 627 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (“These two provisions are fundamentally
different to the extent which an express false statement must be made to the government.”). In GE
Healthcare, the court takes a highly formal approach to conclude that because the implied certification in
Escobar was brought as a presentment claim, the heightened materiality analysis only applies to implied
certifications under those claims. GE Healthcare, 2017 WL 4310263, at *9.
175. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval”), with id. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (“knowingly makes, uses, or causes
to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim” (emphasis added)).
Materiality in § 3729(a)(1)(B) is defined in § 3729(b)(4). Id. § 3729(b)(4) (“[T]he term ‘material’
means having a natural tendency to influence, or being capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of
money or property.”).
176. GE Healthcare, 2017 WL 4310263, at *9; see also United States ex rel. Stepe v. RS Compounding
LLC, No. 13-cv-3150-T-33, 2017 WL 5178183, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2017). In RS Compounding, the
court dismissed the relator’s false record or statement claim under § 3729(a)(1)(B), again disagreeing that
Escobar’s analysis extends further than presentment claims under § 3729(a)(1)(A). Id. Instead,
Escobar deals with the judicially-imposed materiality requirement
for § 3729(a)(1)(A) implied-false certification claims. . . . In contrast, the
materiality requirement for §§ 3729(a)(1)(B) and (G) claims is created by the
statute’s language, and thus the definition of “material” used is that found in the
statute. The parties have not presented case law indicating that Escobar’s rigorous
materiality standard applies to these claims.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Although GE Healthcare’s highly formal approach to interpreting
Escobar may represent a granular look at the details, its attention to
the statutory language of the FCA might suggest an appropriate
purpose and function for Escobar.177 Specifically, whether the
heightened materiality requirement applies to all FCA claims, as some
courts hold, or whether the actual text of the FCA suggests that only a
narrow set of claims needs to satisfy the “demanding” materiality
standard.178
C. The FCA’s Materiality Standard Before and After Escobar
The FCA defines material as “having a natural tendency to
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of
money or property.”179 This standard has long been recognized as more
lenient for relators and the government because it looks to the potential
effect the defendant’s claim has on the government’s decision to pay
instead of the claim’s actual effect. 180 Despite the unambiguous
materiality standard defined in the FCA, the Court in Escobar
explicitly avoided the question of whether the statutory standard
applied to the relator’s implied certification claim.181 The Court
instead acknowledged the roots of materiality through the common law
and relied on a definition of materiality that “look[s] to the effect on
the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged
misrepresentation.”182 Then Justice Thomas, without citation or
177. See infra Section II.C.3.
178. Compare United States ex rel. Arnstein v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 3702, 2019 WL
1245656, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2019) (“The Supreme Court effectively abolished the need to divide
cases into ‘express’ or ‘implied’ certification claims.”), with RS Compounding, 2017 WL 5178183, at *8
(“Escobar deals with the judicially-imposed materiality requirement for § 3729(a)(1)(A) implied-false
certification claims.”).
179. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4).
180. HELMER, supra note 40; see also United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., Inc., 575
F.3d 458, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (“All that is required under the test for materiality, therefore, is that the false
or fraudulent statements have the potential to influence the government’s decisions.”).
181. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) (“We
need not decide whether § 3729(a)(1)(A)’s materiality requirement is governed by § 3729(b)(4) or
derived directly from the common law.”).
182. Id. (emphasis added). The Court recognizes that a “matter is material” in the common law of torts
if “a reasonable man would attach importance to [it] in determining his choice of action in the transaction.”
Id. at 2002–03. Additionally, the Court acknowledges the common law of contracts definition of material
as something that would “induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent.” Id. at 2003.
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analysis, characterized the materiality standard in the FCA as
“demanding.”183
The courts that have applied the Escobar standard to all FCA claims,
including those premised by an express false certification, have relied
on the Court’s test that explains how the demanding materiality
standard should be enforced. Defendants have successfully
emphasized the government’s payment of the claim despite knowledge
of the alleged statutory violation as well as the government’s decision
to label compliance as a condition of payment as relevant but not
dispositive of materiality. 184 These considerations follow the Court’s
insistence that materiality looks to the effect of the government’s
behavior—likely or actual.185 Yet they also seem to be in conflict with
the “natural tendency” standard from the text of the FCA, which only
requires that the defendant’s actions “be capable of influencing” the
government’s decision.186 The Court seemingly avoids this
discrepancy by stating that the “effect on the likely or actual behavior”
and the more lenient statutory standard are one and the same.187 But
questions remain as to whether Escobar created a standard for
materiality that is different from the FCA’s statutory definition.188
183. Id. at 2003.
184. See United States ex rel. Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., No. 08-cv-01885, 2019 WL
3291582, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2019) (Relator’s claim was not material because the defendant
“presented evidence of payment in full by the government on [claims] despite the government’s
knowledge of [defendant’s] noncompliance . . . .”); United States ex rel. Folliard v. Comstor Corp., No.
11-731, 2018 WL 5777085, at *7 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2018) (Relator’s insistence that Congress expressly
conditioned payment with compliance with relevant statutes was not material because “a condition’s
source is separate from its materiality.”).
185. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002.
186. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (emphasis added).
187. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (“We need not decide whether § 3729(a)(1)(A)’s materiality
requirement is governed by § 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common law. Under any
understanding of the concept, materiality ‘look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the
recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.’”).
188. See Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns that Do Not Shoot to Foreign Staplers: Has the Supreme
Court’s Materiality Standard Under Escobar Provided Clarity for the Health Care Industry About Fraud
Under the False Claims Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1255 (2018). Courts interpreting the Escobar
standard are confronted with two apparent standards of materiality: the statutory definition found in
§ 3729(b)(4) and the Supreme Court’s “demanding” formulation:
Two observations arise in connection with this particular issue. First, the Escobar
Court’s decision not to address the relationship between the statutory definition of
‘material’ found in Section 3729(b)(4) and the guidance it set forth regarding how
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1. Before Escobar: Materiality under the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act (FERA)
Long before the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar, most courts
created an implicit requirement that any actionable false claim had to
be material to the government’s payment decision. 189 Courts had to
fashion the materiality requirement themselves because “material”
was not present anywhere in the statutory language. 190 This practice
culminated with the Court’s decision in Allison Engine Co. v. United
States ex rel. Sanders, where the Court held that a defendant must have
the purpose of getting a false claim paid by the government when
submitting a false statement or record under § 3729(a)(1)(B).191
Failing to require an element of intent, according to the Court, would
make the reach of the FCA “almost boundless.”192 In addition to
requiring intent, the Court also required that the defendant’s false
record or statement be material to the government’s payment
to assess materiality has caused confusion among the lower courts about how to
square these two standards. Despite the Court’s clear choice not to utilize the
statutory definition in Escobar, many courts seem compelled by either precedent
or statutory interpretation to utilize the definition as part of any analysis. It would
seem then, that the DOJ is realizing some success as it relates to its argument that
Escobar has not really altered the broadly-applied natural tendency standard. It
does appear, however, that while courts may be applying the statutory definition,
they are simultaneously endorsing the idea that Escobar firmly establishes that the
materiality standard for FCA cases is intended to be demanding and rigorous.
Id.
189. SYLVIA, supra note 18, § 4:57; HELMER, supra note 40, at 278.
190. The predecessor provision of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) was 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) and imposed
liability on a defendant who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.” Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1617, 1621 (codified as amended
at U.S.C. § 3729(a)).
191. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 665, 668–69 (2008) (“‘[T]o
get’ denotes purpose, and thus a person must have the purpose of getting a false or fraudulent claim ‘paid
or approved by the Government’ in order to be liable under § 3729(a)(2).”), superseded by statute, Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.
192. The Court in Allison Engine was particularly concerned with the potential for the FCA to reach
into fields not traditionally considered part of the federal government:
Eliminating this element of intent, as the Court of Appeals did, would expand the
FCA well beyond its intended role of combating “fraud against the Government.”
As the District of Columbia Circuit pointed out, the reach of § 3729(a)(2) would
then be “almost boundless: for example, liability could attach for any false claim
made to any college or university, so long as the institution has received some
federal grants—as most of them do.”
Id. at 669 (citations omitted).
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decision.193 Therefore, although the Court’s decision in Allison Engine
concerned the implied element of intent, in so holding, the Court
parroted the consensus view that the FCA had an implicit requirement
of materiality.194
The members of Congress did not share the Court’s concern of
“boundless” liability. Less than a year after the Court’s Allison Engine
decision, Congress enacted the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
(FERA) to clarify aspects of the FCA that it thought had been
undermined by the courts.195 Congress did not mince words, believing
that “[t]he effectiveness of the False Claims Act has recently been
undermined by court decisions which limit the scope of the law and,
in some cases, allow subcontractors paid with Government money to
escape responsibility for proven frauds.”196
In response to Allison Engine, through FERA, Congress amended
the language of the FCA to remove any doubt that the defendant need
not intend to defraud the government. 197 Additionally, to allay
concerns of runaway liability, the FERA amendments added an
express materiality requirement to two amended provisions of the Act:
false statement or record claims under § 3729(a)(1)(B) and
“obligation” claims under § 3729(a)(1)(G).198 It is important to note
that FERA did not add an express materiality requirement to any other
subsection of fraud under the FCA, including the more common

193. Id. at 665 (“Instead, a plaintiff asserting a [false statement or record] claim must prove that the
defendant intended that the false record or statement be material to the Government’s decision to pay or
approve the false claim.”); see also HELMER, supra note 40, at 279 (the Court “seemingly impl[ied] a
materiality requirement from the phrases ‘to get’ in Section 3729(a)(2) and ‘getting’ in Section
3729(a)(3)”).
194. HELMER, supra note 40, at 278–79. The author points out that the Court in Allison Engine, rather
than explaining why the imposition of materiality is appropriate, “simply did so.” Id. at 279.
195. Id. See generally S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009).
196. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 4.
197. Id. at 12. The words “to get” were removed from the previous provision of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2):
To correct the Allison Engine decision, S. 386 contains three specific changes to
existing section 3729(a)(2) and (a)(3). In section 3729(a)(2) the words ‘‘to get’’
were removed striking the language the Supreme Court found created an intent
requirement for false claims liability under that section. In place of this language,
the Committee inserted the words ‘‘material to’’ a false or fraudulent claim.
Id.
198. Id.; see also Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(a)(2),
123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)).
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“presentment” claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A), which was the subject of
Escobar.199
Additionally, FERA added several definitions of important terms,
including the “natural tendency” definition of materiality.200 In doing
so, FERA settled a dispute in the circuit courts as to the proper FCA
standard of materiality. 201 Although most circuits had adopted the
natural tendency standard which looked to the potential effect of the
defendant’s conduct, other circuits utilized a more stringent “outcome
materiality” test where the relator must prove that the government was
actually influenced by the defendant’s fraudulent conduct.202 The
functional consequence of the outcome materiality standard is that the
defendant’s alleged fraud becomes subjective and, therefore, much
harder to prove.203 By adopting the natural tendency standard in the
statutory text, FERA rejected outcome materiality in favor of a more
lenient, objective standard. 204 In the FCA landscape leading up to
Escobar, courts interpreted FERA as imposing the natural tendency
test as the standard theory of materiality. 205

199. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1997–98 (2016).
The relators in Escobar filed a presentment claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A):
In 2011, respondents filed a qui tam suit in federal court . . . alleging that Universal
Health had violated the False Claims Act under an implied false certification theory
of liability. The operative complaint asserts that Universal Health . . . submitted
reimbursement claims that made representations about the specific services
provided by specific types of professionals, but that failed to disclose serious
violations of regulations pertaining to staff qualifications and licensing
requirements for these services.
Id.
200. S. REP. NO. 111-10; § 4(a)(2), 123 Stat. at 1622–23.
201. Joan H. Krause, Holes in the Triple Canopy: What the Fourth Circuit Got Wrong, 68 S.C. L. REV.
845, 851 (2017).
202. Id.; see also HELMER, supra note 40, at 103–04; United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power
Techs., Inc., 575 F.3d 458, 468–69 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Some courts have defined the standard to require
‘outcome materiality’—‘a falsehood or misrepresentation must affect the government’s ultimate decision
whether to remit funds to the claimant in order to be “material.”’” (quoting United States v. Southland
Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665, 676 (5th Cir. 2002))).
203. Krause, supra note 201 (“The distinction essentially rested on whether a misrepresentation had to
have the actual ability to affect the government’s payment decision or merely the potential to do so.”).
204. Id.
205. See Longhi, 575 F.3d at 470 (“If Congress intended materiality to be defined under the more
narrow outcome materiality standard, it had ample opportunity to adopt the outcome materiality standard
in FERA.”).
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2. The Materiality Standard Post-Escobar
A strict reading of the FCA may suggest that materiality is not
required at all for the majority of actionable false claims defined in the
statute.206 The amendments added by FERA imposed the materiality
requirement to only two provisions, which, by fair inference, may
exclude the requirement to the remaining five provisions.207 Whether
this is a fair reading of the FCA or not, Justice Thomas clearly did not
undertake his normal textual approach in Escobar when he imposed
materiality into the relator’s presentment claim. Materiality appears
nowhere in the presentment provision of § 3729(a)(1)(A), but the
Court nevertheless held that the requirement is implicit. 208
In another departure from a textual reading of the FCA, Justice
Thomas characterized the materiality requirement as “demanding.”209
The only context or analysis provided by the Court for the demanding
standard is a reference to Allison Engine’s pronouncement that the
FCA is not an “all-purpose antifraud statute.”210 Nowhere does the
FCA’s text suggest that materiality is demanding or rigorous, and the
Court’s characterization of the standard is even harder to square with
the actual statutory definition. 211 After all, “tendency” is described by
an “inclination” or a “disposition,” and “capable” is defined as “able
to take in, receive, contain, or hold.”212 The Court’s wordplay is hard
to reconcile, but it makes sense regarding the Court’s policy
considerations for government contractors. Just like in Allison Engine,
206. Krause, supra note 201 (“However, implied certification cases arise instead under the basic false
claims prohibition in § 3729(a)(1)(A), which Congress did not amend. As a purely textual matter, then, it
would appear that the statute does not require materiality for a basic false claim, regardless of whether
that falsity is ‘legal’ or ‘factual’ in nature.”).
207. See id.; see also HELMER, supra note 40, at 280.
208. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A); see also HELMER, supra note 40, at 283–84.
209. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016).
210. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4). Interestingly, Allison Engine represents another textualist departure where
Justice Alito imposed an intent requirement that appeared nowhere in the text of the FCA. Allison Engine
Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 669 (2008), superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617. Justice Alito interpreted the words
“to get” in the pre-FERA provision of the Act as somehow requiring an intent element. Id. at 668–69
(“‘[T]o get’ denotes purpose, and thus a person must have the purpose of getting a false or fraudulent
claim ‘paid or approved by the Government’ in order to be liable under § 3729(a)(2).”).
211. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4).
212. Tendency, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989); Capable, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
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the Court in Escobar reassured itself and contractors that recognizing
implied certification will not create “boundless” liability because the
reach of the FCA can be curtailed “through strict enforcement of the
Act’s materiality and scienter requirements.”213
The factors set out in Escobar that constitute the heightened
materiality standard are not exhaustive and no one factor is dispositive
of the materiality inquiry. 214 Yet courts applying the standard
uniformly agree that the Supreme Court’s test is demanding and
rigorous.215 What courts and scholars have disagreed on is the scope
of the FCA’s materiality standard as a whole in the wake of Escobar.216
Specifically, some scholars note the Court’s departure from the
“natural tendency” test as a sign that Escobar created a new standard
for materiality.217 Relators and the government are quick to point out
that Escobar did nothing to change the existing materiality standard,
and the demanding characterization from the Court is just a way of
illustrating the natural tendency test. 218 With billions of dollars in
penalties at stake, the appropriate scope of the FCA’s materiality
standard cannot be understated.
3. Post-Escobar Materiality and United States ex rel. Badr v.

213. Allison Engine, 553 U.S. at 669; Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (quoting United States v. Sci.
Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
214. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003–04; HELMER, supra note 40, at 283.
215. Farringer, supra note 188. The author notes that some of the courts that apply the “natural
tendency” statutory definition of materiality simultaneously agree that the standard is “demanding and
rigorous” after Escobar. Id.
216. HELMER, supra note 40, at 284 (“[T]he Court’s pronouncements on ‘materiality’ have clouded the
test for deciding whether a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement is material.”); SYLVIA, supra
note 18, § 4:58 (Escobar “affirmed the existing standards of materiality upon which the 2009 amendments
drew. The Court described the standard as ‘demanding,’ but did not adopt a different standard.” (footnote
omitted)); Krause, supra note 201, at 856 (“[T]he Court instead adopted a standard that strongly resembled
the more stringent ‘outcome materiality’ approach.”).
217. Krause, supra note 201, at 856. Professor Krause argues that the Court’s decision in Escobar
requires that the plaintiff show more than the mere potential for harm. Id. at 857; see also Krause, supra
note 14 (“Yet the Court utterly failed to consider the effect of grafting a potentially distinct ‘Escobar
materiality’ standard on to the FERA definition in the statute. By stating that the common law and FERA
materiality standards were equivalent—and then applying an interpretation not seen outside the few
circuits adopting the pre-FERA ‘outcome’ materiality approach—the Court created an intriguing
dilemma.”).
218. See Farringer, supra note 188, at 1253.
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Triple Canopy, Inc.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple
Canopy, Inc. provides a clue for how the standard of materiality should
be applied in the wake of Escobar.219 The Fourth Circuit decided
Triple Canopy I before the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
Escobar and was one of the several cases remanded for further
proceedings after Escobar was decided.220 The relator in Triple
Canopy I alleged two counts of fraud under the FCA: (1) a presentment
claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A) and (2) a false statement or record claim
under § 3729(a)(1)(B).221 The relator’s presentment claim was based
on an implied certification theory that alleged the defendant defense
contractor submitted claims for payment while using security guards
who did not satisfy the marksmanship requirements in the contract
with the United States military. 222 The false records claim was based
on the falsified scorecards that were presented along with the invoices
to the United States. 223 The district court dismissed both of the FCA
claims, and the relator appealed. 224
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision in part
because it found that the defendant’s claims presented to the
government were material to the government’s payment decision. 225
The court found that both the implied certification presentment claim
and the false record claim easily met the natural tendency standard of
the FCA because “[m]ateriality focuses on the ‘potential effect of the
219. United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc. (Triple Canopy II), 857 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2017),
cert. dismissed, 138 S. Ct. 370 (2017) (mem.).
220. United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc. (Triple Canopy I), 775 F.3d 628 (4th Cir. 2015),
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2504 (2016) (mem.), aff’d on other grounds, 857 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2017), cert.
dismissed, 138 S. Ct. 370 (2017) (mem.). Triple Canopy was one of many cases that the Supreme Court
could have decided to hear to determine the fate of implied certification. Krause, supra note 201, at 846
(“A strong argument could be made that Triple Canopy was the most important of these cases, raising the
specter of the federal government relying on security guards who lacked the basic skills needed to use
their weapons. Yet the Fourth Circuit’s rather dry analysis of ‘Theater-Wide Internal Security Services
Task Orders’ lacked the emotional heft of United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Services, Inc.,
a First Circuit case brought by the parents of a young woman, Yarushka Rivera, who died after receiving
Medicaid-covered mental health treatment from a Massachusetts clinic.”).
221. Triple Canopy I, 775 F.3d at 633.
222. Id. at 632.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 633.
225. Id. at 639–40.
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false statement when it is made, not on the actual effect of the false
statement when it is discovered.’”226 Importantly, the court in Triple
Canopy I suggests that the natural tendency standard applied to the
relator’s implied certification claim even though there is no express
materiality requirement in § 3729(a)(1)(A).227
The outcome of Triple Canopy I was subject to the Fourth Circuit’s
application of Escobar on remand from the Supreme Court.228 But,
after having the original decision vacated, the Fourth Circuit in Triple
Canopy II reached the same conclusion—albeit through a different
route.229 The court applied Escobar’s “demanding” standard to the
relator’s implied certification claim to conclude that the relator
sufficiently plead materiality and held that its decision in Triple
Canopy I would not be altered.230 More important, however, was the
fact that the court’s Escobar analysis was dedicated solely to the
relator’s implied certification claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A).231 The
court held that Escobar had no impact on the relator’s false record
claim under § 3729(a)(1)(B) and decided that it did not need to alter
its analysis from Triple Canopy I.232
A close reading of Triple Canopy II indicates that Escobar did not
create an altogether different standard of materiality but rather a
separate and more rigorous standard for implied certification claims
arising under § 3729(a)(1)(A).233 The Fourth Circuit chose not to alter
the materiality analysis of the relator’s false records claim because the
statutory language already requires the natural tendency standard, and
226. Id. at 639 (first quoting United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352
F.3d 908, 916–17 (4th Cir. 2003); and then citing United States ex rel. Feldman v. van Gorp, 697 F.3d 78,
96 (2d Cir. 2012)).
227. See Krause, supra note 201, at 853–54 (“[T]he judges clearly applied the FERA definition of
materiality to the implied certification allegations, indicating that they believed the FERA ‘natural
tendency’ test governed both FCA sections at issue.”).
228. Triple Canopy II, 857 F.3d 174, 175 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 138 S. Ct. 370 (2017) (mem.).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 178.
231. Id. at 177 (“Our task is straightforward: we must determine whether [Escobar] alters our earlier
conclusion that the Government stated a claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A).”).
232. Id. at 179 (“We also reinstate those portions of our opinion that were not impacted by Universal
Health . . . .” (emphasis added)).
233. Id. at 177 n.2 (“Nothing in Universal Health affects our conclusion that the Government properly
pled a false records claim under § 3729(a)(1)(B) or that Badr failed to state a claim regarding his
allegations that Triple Canopy operated a similar scheme at several others bases in Iraq.”).
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the court already concluded that the relator sufficiently plead the
standard in Triple Canopy I.234 Conversely, the relator’s presentment
claim had no express materiality requirement, and therefore, Escobar
directed the court to reconsider the claim in light of the demanding
standard imposed by the Supreme Court for implied certification
claims.235 Other district courts have found the Fourth Circuit’s
treatment of Escobar and implied certifications instructive. 236
Although Triple Canopy II does not implicate an express certification
claim, the decision provides strong evidence that Escobar is limited to
implied certifications.
III. PROPOSAL
The consequence of courts applying Escobar’s heightened standard
of materiality to cases brought under express false certifications is that
meritorious FCA claims are defeated at the motion to dismiss or
summary judgement stages where they would otherwise be
successful.237 Although the Supreme Court does not articulate whether
express certifications are safe from scrutiny under Escobar, Part III of
this Note contends that the context of the Court’s decision, a close
reading of the 2009 FERA amendments, and fundamental
constitutional principles require that Escobar’s materiality standard be
limited to implied false certifications. Section A discusses the nature
of the FCA’s “natural tendency” materiality standard as codified by

234. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record
or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim” (emphasis added)). Materiality in § 3729(a)(1)(B) is
defined in § 3729(b)(4). 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (“[T]he term ‘material’ means having a natural tendency
to influence, or be[ing] capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”).
235. Triple Canopy II, 857 F.3d at 177 (“Universal Health made two rulings relevant here. First, the
Court held (as we did in our earlier panel decision) that the implied certification theory of liability is valid
in certain circumstances. Second, the Court counseled that concerns about abuse of the theory should be
addressed by employing a rigorous materiality requirement.” (emphasis added)).
236. See United States ex rel. Stepe v. RS Compounding LLC, No. 13-cv-3150-T-33, 2017 WL
5178183, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2017) (“Escobar deals with the judicially-imposed materiality
requirement for § 3729(a)(1)(A) implied-false certification claims. . . . Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has
declined to alter its analysis under § 3729(a)(1)(B) following Escobar.” (citations omitted)); United States
ex rel. Patel v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 14-cv-120-T-33, 2017 WL 4310263, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28,
2017).
237. See generally supra Section II.A.
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the 2009 FERA amendments and concludes that express false
certifications satisfy that standard.238 Section B discusses the
constitutional questions that arise when courts decide that express false
certifications are not material to the government’s payment decision
under Escobar.239
A. Express Certifications Satisfy the Existing FCA Materiality
Standard
Triple Canopy II indicates that the heightened Escobar materiality
standard is reserved for false claims premised by implied certifications
to guard against abuse of the theory. 240 The district courts that have
found the Fourth Circuit’s analysis useful have acknowledged that
Escobar’s standard is a judicially-imposed doctrine used to ensure that
FCA liability attaches only to significant violations of statutory,
regulatory, or contractual requirements.241 Triple Canopy II also
suggests that Escobar did not alter the natural tendency standard for
materiality in other FCA claims. 242
The problem for relators alleging false claims based on express
certifications is that the allegations can take the form of
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) claims which, under Escobar, have the
judicially-imposed materiality requirement. 243 The practice of
requiring all presentment claims, including express certifications, to
pass muster under Escobar stems from an overly broad reading of the
Supreme Court’s opinion.244 It is true that the Court imposed a
materiality requirement onto § 3729(a)(1)(A) claims, and it is equally
true that Justice Thomas characterized the requirement as
238. See infra Section III.A.
239. See infra Section III.B.
240. Triple Canopy II, 857 F.3d at 177.
241. GE Healthcare, 2017 WL 4310263, at *9 (“GE cites no case holding that Escobar’s heightened
definition of materiality applies to a claim under § 3729(a)(1)(B). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has declined
to alter its analysis under § 3729(a)(1)(B) following Escobar.” (citing Triple Canopy II, 857 F.3d at 179)).
242. Triple Canopy II, 857 F.3d at 177 n.2. Triple Canopy II left intact its holding from Triple Canopy
I, which held that the relator’s § 3729(a)(1)(B) claim satisfied the FCA’s natural tendency standard. Id. at
179.
243. HELMER, supra note 40, at 282. Express and implied certifications are only theories of falsity and
are not limited to any particular provision of the FCA. See SYLVIA, supra note 18, § 4:34.
244. See supra Section II.B.
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“demanding” and “rigorous.”245 But it is also important to remember
that the Court imposed a requirement that appears nowhere in the text
of the FCA.246 One could infer from a strict textual reading of the FCA
that § 3729(a)(1)(A) claims do not have to be material because
Congress had the opportunity to add an express materiality
requirement in FERA and chose not to do so. 247
The Court obviously considered materiality to be required for all
forms of fraud under the Act because “the common law could not have
conceived of ‘fraud’ without proof of materiality.”248 If the Court
decided that the materiality inherent in all types of fraud is
characterized by the natural tendency standard defined in the FCA,
then perhaps Escobar would not have been extended beyond its
intended purpose. The real damage done by the court came from
characterizing the standard as “demanding.”249 In doing so, the Court
imposed a requirement that does not exist anywhere in the statutory
text and characterized the standard as far more stringent than the
standard actually defined in the FCA. 250 The court’s imposition of the
demanding standard has defeated cases premised by express
certifications where they otherwise could have succeeded under the
more lenient understanding of the FCA’s materiality requirement.251
Reading the FERA amendments and Escobar in the proper context
would provide a workable solution. Before FERA, Congress clearly
believed the courts had been limiting the reach of the FCA out of
concern that the law was imposing significant liability on the private

245. HELMER, supra note 40, at 282–84; Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,
136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002, 2003 (2016).
246. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A); HELMER, supra note 40, at 282.
247. Krause, supra note 201; see also HELMER, supra note 40, at 278 (“Prior to [FERA], whether
materiality was a required element of civil FCA action was doubtful in this author’s view. . . .”).
248. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999)).
249. Id. at 2003.
250. Krause, supra note 201, at 856 (“As interpreted under the FCA, the various definitions of
materiality have most assuredly not been interpreted as equivalent, nor as particularly ‘demanding.’ Far
from being viewed as a high bar, FERA’s ‘natural tendency to influence’ language has been interpreted
as signifying a relatively low threshold for implied certification cases.”).
251. See supra Section II.A.2.
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sector.252 This judicial intervention culminated with Allison Engine.253
The Supreme Court believed that requiring an implicit intent
requirement would prevent the FCA from creating “boundless”
liability.254 Congress disagreed and amended the law to provide
clarity.255 Congress explicitly singled out the Court’s decision in
Allison Engine to make its intention clear: “The Allison Engine
decision created a significant question about the scope and
applicability of the FCA to certain false claims, effectively limiting
FCA coverage for some Government programs and funds.”256
Fast forward to Escobar, where the Court was again tasked with
interpreting the FCA in a way that could vastly extend the reach of the
law.257 Even though the Court legitimized the implied certification
theory of liability, the pervasiveness of the theory was significantly
hampered by the demanding materiality standard. 258 As with Allison
Engine, the Court imposed a standard that is nowhere in the text of the
statute out of concern for an “extraordinarily expansive view of
liability.”259 The problem with the Court’s interpretation is that
Congress arguably does view the FCA expansively. 260 The
252. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009).
253. Id.; see also HELMER, supra note 40, at 92 (characterizing Allison Engine decision as the “final
straw”).
254. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 669 (2008) (“Eliminating this
element of intent, as the Court of Appeals did, would expand the FCA well beyond its intended role of
combating ‘fraud against the Government.’” (citing Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592
(1958))), superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.
255. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(a)(1), 123 Stat.
1617, 1621–22 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)). The section of FERA that amended portions
of the FCA was conveniently titled, “Clarifications to the False Claims Act to Reflect the Original Intent
of the Law.” Id. § 4, 123 Stat. at 1621.
256. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 11.
257. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1998 (2016)
(acknowledging circuit split and granting certiorari to “resolve the disagreement among the Courts of
Appeals over the validity and scope of the implied false certification theory of liability”).
258. Id. at 2002 (“[C]oncerns about fair notice and open-ended liability ‘can be effectively addressed
through strict enforcement of the Act’s materiality and scienter requirements.’” (quoting United States v.
Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2010))).
259. Id. at 2004.
260. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 19 (1986). The Senate committee “strongly” endorsed a view of the FCA
that is “intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the
Government.” Id. (quoting United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968)); see also S.
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amendments in 1986 and again in 2009 reflect Congress’s intent to use
the FCA as the primary vehicle to recover illegally obtained money
from the treasury.261 In fact, Senator Chuck Grassley, who is
well-known for being the FCA’s biggest supporter in Congress, has
made it known that he believes the courts are applying Escobar too
strictly.262 Senator Grassley introduced a bill in July 2021 that seeks to
“clarif[y] the current law following confusion and misinterpretation of
the Supreme Court decision in Universal Health Services[, Inc.] v.
United States ex rel. Escobar[.]”263 The bill would require defendants
to rebut a showing of materiality by clear and convincing evidence. 264
Therefore, to avoid another correction from Congress, courts should
recognize Escobar for what it is—a policy limitation of the FCA to
prevent government contractors from paying billions of dollars for
minor statutory violations. The fear with implied certification is that it
could turn minor statutory violations into significant FCA penalties.265
In response, the Supreme Court fashioned a higher standard for relators
and the government to meet if they succeed in prosecuting those

REP. NO. 111-10, at 10. Congress believed that Allison Engine’s limitation of the scope of the FCA was
“contrary to Congress’s original intent in passing the law and creates a new element in a FCA claim and
a new defense for any subcontractor that are inconsistent with the purpose and language of the statute.”
Id.
261. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2; S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10.
262. Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm., Interpreting the False Claims Act:
Prepared Senate Floor Statement (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/newsreleases/interpreting-false-claims-act [https://perma.cc/L2TN-GR85]; see Emily Reeder-Ricchetti &
Christian D. Sheehan, Senator Grassley at It Again, Proposes New False Claims Act Amendments,
ARNOLD
&
PORTER
KAYE
SCHOLER
LLP
(July
28,
2021),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/blogs/fca-qui-notes/posts/2021/07/senator-grassley-at-itagain [https://perma.cc/XB39-8TQF] (calling Senator Grassley a “long-time . . . champion” of the FCA).
Senator Grassley lamented that the courts “are trying to outdo each other in applying Thomas’ analysis
inappropriately or as strictly as possible—to the point of absurdity.” Grassley, supra.
263. Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Senators Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Fight Government
Waste, Fraud (July 26, 2021), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/senators-introduceof-bipartisan-legislation-to-fight-government-waste-fraud [https://perma.cc/BVA9-US9K].
264. False Claims Amendments Act of 2021, S. 2428, 117th Cong. § 2(e)(2) (2021). It is unclear what
effect this amendment would have on the Escobar materiality standard. As it stands now, relators and the
government must first prove materiality by a preponderance of the evidence. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(d). The
bill, therefore, appears to put a higher burden on the defendant to rebut materiality. Brian Dunphy,
Laurence Freedman & Samantha Kingsbury, Senator Grassley and Others Propose Amendments to the
False Claims Act, JD SUPRA (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/senator-grassley-andothers-propose-3704208/ [https://perma.cc/A9FA-VLT3].
265. Anikeeff & Ball, supra note 12.
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specific claims. 266 Yet the fear of runaway liability does not exist with
express certifications. In those cases, the defendant makes explicit
false statements of compliance to obtain money from the federal
government that it otherwise would not be entitled to. 267 The defendant
cannot receive payment without first lying to the government. 268
Moreover, these types of express false statements fit squarely within
Congress’s expansive view of the FCA to “reach all types of fraud,
without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the
Government.”269
Fortunately for the government and potential relators, recent case
law suggests a trend toward limiting Escobar to the context of implied
false certification. 270 In Ruckh v. Salus Rehabilitation, LLC, the
Eleventh Circuit made short shrift over the materiality of the defendant
nursing home’s affirmative representations about its billing practices
on Medicare claim forms. 271 The court did not apply the indicia of
materiality set out in Escobar and, instead, described the defendant’s
affirmative statements on Medicare claim forms as “plain and obvious
materiality” because the certifications were the essence of the
defendant’s economic relationship with the government. 272 Ruckh
illustrates the principle that a defendant’s explicit lies always have the
natural tendency to influence the government’s payment decision and,
therefore, easily satisfy the FCA’s standard for materiality.

266. Triple Canopy II, 857 F.3d 174, 177 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 138 S. Ct. 370 (2017) (mem.).
267. See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 2001), overruled by Universal Health Servs., Inc.
v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). A defendant makes express certification by
making a claim that “falsely certifies compliance with a particular statute, regulation or contractual term,
where compliance is a prerequisite to payment.” Id. Unlike implied certifications, express certifications
implicate the defendant’s actual statements, which are fully within its control. Id.
268. See United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir.
2008) (quoting Mikes, 274 F.3d at 698). The defendant expressly certifies compliance with an underlying
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement that is “a prerequisite to payment.” Id.
269. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 19 (1986); United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968).
270. Ruckh v. Salus Rehab., LLC, 963 F.3d 1089, 1105 (11th Cir. 2020); United States ex rel. STF,
LLC v. Vibrant Am., LLC, No. 16-cv-02487, 2020 WL 4818706, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2020). In
Vibrant America, the court refused to apply Escobar’s materiality inquiry to the defendant’s violation of
the Anti-Kickback Statute because the relator was “not seeking to turn a ‘garden-variety’ regulatory
violation into an FCA claim.” Id.
271. Ruckh, 963 F.3d at 1104.
272. Id. at 1105.
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To dismiss express certification claims because they do not meet
Escobar’s materiality standard is not only to misinterpret the Court’s
opinion, it is also contrary to how Congress believes the FCA should
function.273 Courts can continue to follow Escobar by reading
materiality into express certifications, but the standard imposed should
be the statutorily defined natural tendency test for materiality. 274 By
recognizing that Escobar’s heightened materiality standard is
judicially-imposed to guard against the reach of implied certifications,
courts can adhere to Escobar as well as the intent of the FCA.
B. Separation of Powers Requires that Express Certifications
Imposed by Congress Are Material as a Matter of Law
At oral argument in Escobar, Chief Justice Roberts asked the
attorney representing the government whether a defendant who
contracts for health services would violate the FCA if it used foreignmade staplers when the contract called for staplers made in the United
States.275 The attorney replied by admitting that in some circumstances
the government has an interest in enforcing ancillary policy goals
through government contracting. 276 The colloquy, although brief (and
apparently cursory), certainly made an impression on Justice Thomas,
who incorporated the exchange in the Court’s opinion as an example
of an impermissibly expansive view of FCA liability.277 The Court’s
position is entirely understandable—a government contractor
certifying compliance with the entire United States Code and Code of
Federal Regulations could certainly impose blanket FCA liability. 278
Such was the view from FCA defendants leading up to Escobar.
Recall that the debate over whether a statutory, regulatory, or
273. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8; Neifert-White, 390 U.S. at 232.
274. HELMER, supra note 40, at 282. Regardless of whether Escobar applies equally to implied and
express false certifications, one key takeaway is that the Court required materiality to be read in to
all § 3729(a)(1)(A) claims. Id.
275. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,
136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (No. 15-7); Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004.
276. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (No. 15-7).
277. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004; see also SYLVIA, supra note 18, § 4:58. The exchange at oral
argument quickly moved on to a different topic, and the government’s answer to the hypothetical was
never returned to. Id.
278. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004.
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contractual requirement was an express condition of payment was a
big point of contention in the circuit courts leading up to Escobar.279
The majority of courts that upheld implied certification cautioned that
the theory was only viable where Congress had expressly designated
compliance with the law as a condition of payment. 280 In fact,
Universal Health argued in the alternative that this was the only way
to limit the reach of implied certification. 281 The Court rejected this
argument because adopting the intended limitation would have the
opposite effect: the government could easily condition payment on any
contract with compliance with the entire United States Code and Code
of Federal Regulations. 282 Such a blanket imposition of compliance
with the law would make materiality under the FCA even more
arbitrary.283 The Court attempted to find a balance by characterizing
the government’s label of a condition of payment as “relevant, but not
automatically dispositive” of materiality.284 Yet defendants have
seized upon this holding as an effective way of defeating relators’
claims on motions to dismiss or at summary judgement—regardless of
which theory of falsity the relator argues.285
Treating the government’s label of statutory requirements as not
automatically dispositive of materiality is understandable enough for
implied certifications. Ultimately, the Court’s heightened standard is
designed to prevent abuse of that theory of liability. 286 Whether this is

279. Id. at 1999 (“Other courts have accepted the theory [of implied certification], but limit its
application to cases where defendants fail to disclose violations of expressly designated conditions of
payment.”).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 2002 (“Universal Health nonetheless contends that False Claims Act liability should be
limited to undisclosed violations of expressly designated conditions of payment to provide defendants
with fair notice and to cabin liability.”).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003.
285. See United States ex rel. Mei Ling v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-974, 2018 WL 3814498, at
*13 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2018) (The City of Los Angeles expressly certified compliance in multiple grant
applications to HUD); United States ex rel. Folliard v. Comstor Corp., No. 11-731, 2018 WL 5777085, at
*7 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2018) (“A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because the
Government designates compliance with a particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement as
a condition of payment.” (first quoting Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003; and then citing Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at
2004)).
286. Triple Canopy II, 857 F.3d 174 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 138 S. Ct. 370 (2017) (mem.).
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true for express certifications is a different question. Although the
Court interpreted the government’s response to Chief Justice Roberts’s
hypothetical as an overly broad view of FCA liability, the answer to
the hypothetical raises important questions regarding the materiality of
express certifications. After all, it is Congress and the Executive
Branch that label statutory and regulatory requirements as express
conditions of payment.287 What if, as the government suggested at oral
argument, the United States wants to enforce ancillary policy goals by
adding express conditions of payment into government contracts? 288
What are the consequences of the courts invalidating the legislative
and administrative policy of the other two branches of government?
Take, for example, the district court’s dismissal for lack of
materiality in United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortgage Investors
Corp.289 The Bibby court did not recognize that the VA program at
issue was “solely intended to assist veterans by allowing their monthly
payments to be reduced . . . .”290 It is evident that Congress enacted the
legislation to ensure that low-income veterans can participate in the
housing market where they would otherwise be excluded from.291 The
VA program allows low-income veterans “to finance home purchases
even though they may not have the resources to qualify for
conventional loans.”292 The disallowance of certain closing costs,
although seemingly inconsequential, is present in the statutory
framework because they are inexorably related to the overall purpose
of the legislation, which is to provide a financial benefit to low-income
veterans.293 The express certification of compliance with the VA
287. See United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., No. 12-CV-04020, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
232351, at *42–43 (N.D. Ga. July 1, 2019) (citing 38 C.F.R. § 36.4313(a) (2018)), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 987 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2021) (mem.); Folliard, 2018 WL
5777085, at *1 (to be eligible to contract with the government, contactors had to certify compliance with
the Trade Agreement Act, which Congress passed).
288. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (No. 15-7).
289. See supra Section II.A.3.
290. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1165, at 3 (1980).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 2.
293. See United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., No. 12-CV-04020, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
232351, at *24–25 (N.D. Ga. July 1, 2019) (“Based upon the fact that the ‘VA home loan program
involves a veteran’s benefit[,] VA policy has evolved around the objective of helping the veteran to use
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regulation disallowing closing costs is intended to ensure that the
mortgage lender is providing the financial benefit of the VA program
to the veteran.294
By requiring mortgage lenders to expressly certify regulatory
compliance to be eligible for a government guaranteed loan, the VA
chose to enforce ancillary policy goals through the vehicle of
government contracting.295 In doing so, the VA made a policy decision
about what conduct from the mortgage lender is material to its decision
to issue the guaranteed loan. The lender’s express certification has
more than the natural tendency to influence the VA’s decision—it is
the foundation of their legal and financial relationship.296 Without the
lender’s express certification of compliance, the VA does not issue the
loan. Yet the court in Bibby, following the lead from Escobar, decided
that the lender’s express certification was in fact not material to the
VA’s decision.297 The court did this despite the fact that it was
Congress, not the courts, that chose to enact legislation to provide a
financial benefit to veterans, and it was the VA, not the courts, that
decided that the lender’s express certification was a material
requirement of Congress’s legislative agenda.298 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.299 According to that opinion, the district court gave too
much weight to the government’s subjective behavior after the false
certifications were made and, instead, should have let a jury weigh the

his or her home loan benefit.’ In light of this objective, ‘VA regulations limit the fees that the veteran can
pay to obtain a loan.’ As such, ‘[l]enders must strictly adhere to the limitations on borrower-paid fees and
charges when making VA loans.’” (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 987 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2021) (mem.).
294. See Complaint at 15–16, Bibby, No. 12-CV-04020 (“This policy is violated when the lender
charges unallowable fees to the veteran, circumventing the underlying objectives of the [VA Program].”).
295. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,
136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (No. 15-7).
296. Complaint at 17, Bibby, No. 12-CV-04020 (“Lenders are required to affirmatively represent to the
VA, by written certifications, that they have fully complied with the law and with VA rules and regulations
in processing [the loan]. The lender’s written certifications are a condition precedent to the VA’s issuance
of a loan guaranty.”).
297. Bibby, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232351, at *46–47.
298. See id. at *22–27 (discussing statutes and regulations of VA loan program).
299. United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., 987 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
209 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2021) (mem.).
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“holistic” set of factors from Escobar.300 One such factor, according to
the Eleventh Circuit, was that the defendant’s loan certifications went
to the “very essence of the bargain” with the government.301
The mistake of the district court in Bibby was to tether the strength
of materiality with seemingly minor violations of the federal code and
to give much more weight to the government’s post hoc subjective
actions.302 This type of subjective analysis is reasonable in the context
of implied false certification where contractors must certify
compliance with a myriad of statutes and regulations.303 But there is
an important distinction to be made when Congress conditions
payment with the contractor’s express certification with a specific law
or regulation.304 After all, an express certification is a promise made
by the contractor to provide the benefit that Congress bargained for.305
That benefit is designed through the legislative process with the intent
of implementing public policy, and the contractor’s promise ensures
that the intended policy is being effectively carried out. 306 By
conditioning payment with an express certification, Congress itself has
decided that the contractor’s promise to keep its end of the bargain is
material to the legislative purpose.
300. Id. at 1352.
301. Id. at 1347–48.
302. Bibby, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232351, at *52 (“The VA’s apparent acquiescence—evidenced by
its sole use of refunds to the exclusion of other administrative sanctions, mandating indemnification,
voiding the loan guarantee or reducing the claim amount—to the widespread practice of lenders charging
unallowable fees does not bode well for Relators.”).
303. See United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 711 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom.
United States ex rel. Nelson v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 136 S. Ct. 2506 (2016) (mem.). The decision in
Sanford-Brown is representative of the courts who outright rejected implied certification as a viable theory
of liability because it is unreasonable to require “continued compliance with the thousands of pages of
federal statutes and regulations” as a basis for FCA liability. Id.; see also Stephens, supra note 7, at
281–82.
304. Bibby, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232351, at *42–43 (mortgage lenders must comply with specific
VA regulations to be eligible for government-guaranteed loans); United States ex rel. Mei Ling v. City of
Los Angeles, No. CV 11-974, 2018 WL 3814498, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2018) (cities must certify
compliance with specific housing accessibility laws and Housing and Urban Development regulations in
order to be eligible for housing loans); United States ex rel. Folliard v. Comstor Corp., No. 11-731, 2018
WL 5777085, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2018) (companies must certify compliance to the Trade Agreement
Act in order to be paid under government contracts).
305. See 38 C.F.R. § 36.4313(a) (2020) (“[N]o loan shall be guaranteed or insured unless the lender
certifies to the Secretary that it has not imposed and will not impose any charges or fees against the
borrower in excess of those permissible under paragraph (d) or (e) of this section.” (emphasis added)).
306. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 96-1165 (1980).
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Applying Escobar to express certifications, therefore, takes the
question of materiality away from Congress and transfers it to the
courts. To avoid such constitutional problems, courts should limit
Escobar to the implied certification context where the question of
materiality is not always clear. Doing so appreciates Escobar for its
appropriate purpose and does not run the risk of the courts deciding
important policy issues, which should always be the province of the
political branches.
CONCLUSION
Reconsider the hypothetical. 307 The United States contracts with a
private construction company to build a government office building.
As a result of an ongoing trade war with China, Congress enacts a piece
of legislation with the intent of boosting production of American steel.
This new legislation requires that for any construction project with the
government, the contractor must use American-made nails to be
eligible for payment. The contractor must expressly certify on every
invoice submitted to the government that it has only used
American-made nails in each phase of the project. If the construction
company requests payment from the government with the knowledge
that it has used Chinese-made nails in the final phase of the project,
has the company’s statutory violation become fraudulent?
The lesson from Escobar is that what separates a mere breach of
contract from fraud is the materiality of the broken promise. In the case
of an implied certification of compliance, the contractor has not
expressly promised anything. Therefore, for his conduct to become
fraudulent, it must be intentional and highly material to the
government’s decision to approve his claim.
Where he has expressly made a promise to follow the law but
chooses not to, however, the materiality of his conduct is
straightforward. First, the contractor’s lies are more than capable of
influencing the government’s decision.308 To require more than the
307. See supra p. 1.
308. See supra Section III.A.
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natural tendency of his actions to influence the government is to ignore
the text and purpose of the FCA. Second, and more importantly, the
materiality of his actions has already been decided by Congress.309 To
take the question of materiality away from Congress is to mistake the
appropriate constitutional role of the courts.

309. See supra Section III.B.
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